

THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY

EDITED BY

M. PLATNAUER, M.A., B.Litt.

AND

B. L. HALLWARD, M.A.

BOARD OF MANAGEMENT:

Prof. D. S. ROBERTSON, M.A. (*Chairman*) *representing the Cambridge Philological Society.*

J. G. BARRINGTON-WARD, M.A.
(*Hon. Treasurer*)
Prof. J. F. DOBSON, M.A.
Prof. H. A. ORMEROD, M.A.
F. H. SANDBACH, M.A.
Prof. E. H. WARMINGTON, M.A.


*Representing the Council
of the Classical
Association.*

E. A. BARBER, M.A. (*Hon. Secretary*),
representing the Oxford Philological Society.

With the co-operation of Prof. TENNEY FRANK, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY; Prof. E. K. RAND,
HARVARD UNIVERSITY; and Prof. W. J. WOODHOUSE, SYDNEY UNIVERSITY.

VOLUME XXX

PUBLISHED FOR THE CLASSICAL ASSOCIATION BY
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, LONDON, W.
AND
G. E. STECHERT & CO., 31-33, EAST 10TH STREET, NEW YORK
1936



Winged
Plato's
The Aut
On the
Plotinus

Summarie
Litera

Jacobsoh
The Δεύτ
On Plato
Observat
Notes on
Pauses in
The Bâle
The Metr
Three No
Notes on
Trisyllabi
Indivisibl

Summaries
Litera

TABLE OF CONTENTS

No. 1.

	PAGE
Winged Words. J. A. K. THOMSON	I
Plato's Theism. R. HACKFORTH	4
The Authorship of Sappho β_2 (<i>Lobel</i>). D. L. PAGE	10
On the Manuscripts of the <i>De Caelo</i> of Aristotle. D. J. ALLAN	16
Plotinus and India. A. H. ARMSTRONG	22
 <i>Summaries of Periodicals :</i>	
Literature and General	29

No. 2.

Jacobsohn's Law of Plautine Scansion. W. A. LAIDLAW	33
The $\Delta\epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\sigma$ $\Pi\lambda\omega\bar{\nu}$ in the <i>Phaedo</i> . N. R. MURPHY	40
On Plato: <i>Laws</i> X 889cd. J. TATE	48
Observations on the First Book of Lucan. ROBERT J. GETTY	55
Notes on Menander. A. W. GOMME	64
Pauses in the Tragic Senarius. J. D. DENNISTON	73
The Bâle and Leyden Scholia to Thucydides. J. E. POWELL	80
The Metre of Pindar, <i>Olympian II</i> . C. M. BOWRA	94
Three Notes on the <i>Choephoroi</i> . M. TIERNEY	100
Notes on the <i>Oresteia</i> . GEORGE THOMSON	105
Trisyllabic Feet in the Dialogue of Aeschylus. E. C. YORKE	116
Indivisible Lines. A. T. NICOL	120

Summaries of Periodicals :

Literature and General	127
----------------------------------	-----

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Nos. 3, 4.

	PAGE
Pindar, <i>Pythian XI.</i> C. M. BOWRA	129
Plato, Socrates and the Myths. J. TATE	142
The Aldine Scholia to Thucydides. J. E. POWELL	146
The Meaning of ΑΠΤΕΡΟΣ. E. C. YORKE	151
The Date of the <i>Prometheus Vinctus.</i> E. C. YORKE	153
A Manuscript of Ovid's <i>Heroides.</i> S. G. OWEN	155
Tria Genera Causarum. D. A. G. HINKS	170
ΣΧΟΛΗ. J. L. STOCKS	177
Porphyry, <i>De Abstinentia I 7-12.</i> M. J. BOYD	188
Additional Note on Pauses in the Tragic Senarius. J. D. DENNISTON	192
Additional Note on Menander. A. W. GOMME	193
The Greek Letters of M. Junius Brutus. R. E. SMITH	194
Aristotle and the Koine—Notes on the Prepositions. P. T. STEVENS	204
<i>Summaries of Periodicals :</i>	
Literature and General	218
Indices	221

PAGE
129
142
146
151
153
155
170
177
188
192
193
194
204

218

221

The C
Associ
double

J. G
Pro
Pro
F. I
W

V

V
P
T
C
F
S

O. Finlayson

The CLASSICAL QUARTERLY and CLASSICAL REVIEW are the organs of the Classical Association. The QUARTERLY is published in January, April, and October, the last issue being a double number; the REVIEW in February, May, July, September, November, and December.

THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY

EDITED BY

M. PLATNAUER, Brasenose College, Oxford.
B. L. HALLWARD, M.A., Peterhouse, Cambridge.

Board of Management:

Prof. D. S. ROBERTSON, M.A., *Chairman, representing the Cambridge Philological Society.*

J. G. BARRINGTON-WARD, M.A. (*Hon. Vice-Chairman*)
Prof. J. F. DOBSON, M.A.
Prof. H. A. ORMEROD, M.A.
F. H. SANDBACH, M.A.

Representing the Council of the Classical Association.

E. A. HARRER, M.A. (*Hon. Secretary*),
representing the Oxford Philological Society.

With the co-operation of Prof. TENNEY FRANK, Johns Hopkins University, Prof. E. K. RAND, Harvard University, and Prof. W. J. WOODHOUSE, Sydney University.

Vol. XXX.

JANUARY, 1936

No. 1

CONTENTS

	30	71	1936	PAGE
WINGED WORDS				J. A. K. THOMSON 1
PLATO'S THEISM				R. HACKFORTH 4
THE AUTHORSHIP OF SAPPHO $\beta 2$ (LOBEL)				D. L. PAGE 10
ON THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE <i>De Caelo</i> OF ARISTOTLE				D. J. ALLAN 16
PLUTONIUS AND INDIA				A. H. ARMSTRONG 22
SUMMARIES OF PERIODICALS: LITERATURE AND GENERAL				29

LONDON: JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.

NEW YORK: G. E. STECHERT & CO., 31-33, EAST 10TH STREET

Price for single numbers, 4/- net (4/2 post free); for double numbers, 8/- net (8/4 post free).
Yearly Subscription 16/- post free; U.S.A. \$4. Combined Yearly Subscription for the
CLASSICAL QUARTERLY and the CLASSICAL REVIEW, 26/- post free; U.S.A. \$8.25.

FRONDÉS SALICIS

By A. B. RAMSAY

5s. net

A companion volume to *Ros Rosarum* and *Inter Lilia*, containing original Latin verse, English verse with the brevity and tang of Latin, and skilful renderings into Latin of poems by Housman, Kipling, and others.

VERGIL: Aeneid

BOOK I

Edited by R. S. CONWAY

8s. 6d. net

'It is a worthy memorial of a fine scholar, a striking personality, and a great Vergil lover. It has a freshness and individuality of its own . . . a very interesting and stimulating work.'—*The Classical Review*.

THE HISTORIAN EPHORUS

By G. L. BARBER

7s. 6d. net

The discussion of Ephorus (floruit 4th century B.C.) began more than a century ago and culminated in the publication in 1923 of Jacoby's collection of the fragments, but this is the first English work dealing with him specifically as a historian.

SENATE AND PROVINCES

78-49 B.C.

Some Aspects of the Foreign Policy and Provincial Relations of the Senate during the Closing Years of the Roman Republic.

By J. M. COBBAN

8s. 6d. net

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

TH

The
arrows
 $\pi\tau\pi\rho\sigma\tau$
means
their
iérau or
or stone

That the
with wh
air-curre
that the
through
is their
function

An
elaborate
Arrow,
(chap. x

(a)
flies to t

(b)
the left.

(c)
up to a

(d)
to the ri

From
does not
swerves
Homer,
the impo
the expre
himself t
disguise.
mother t
 $\bar{\alpha}\pi\pi\tau\pi\sigma\tau$ $\bar{\epsilon}$
(Observe
from its
Telemach
armour i

NO. I.

THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY

JANUARY, 1936.

WINGED WORDS.

THE metaphor is derived from archery. The epithet *πτερόεις* is appropriate to arrows [*πτερόεντες ὄυτοι* E 171, *ἰὸν ἀβλῆτα πτερόεντα* Δ 117, *ἰοὶ πτερόεντες* Π 773, *ἴα πτερόεντα* Υ 68]. Just as *ἴα πτερόεντα* means 'feathered arrows,' so *ἔπεια πτερόεντα* means 'feathered words.' The early Greeks, when they formed a picture of words in their minds, thought of them as missiles—not as birds. Whence 'to utter' words is *λέναι* or *ἀφίέναι*. Missiles so light are more readily imagined as arrows than as spears or stones.

The feathers of an arrow do not help it to fly far; they help it to fly straight. That this is so can be demonstrated in practice; why it is so is a scientific problem with which a classical scholar is hardly bound to concern himself. Apparently the air-currents generated by the flight of the arrow act upon the feathers in such a way that the shaft is kept steadily upon its path. They in a manner *steer* the arrow through the fluid much as the rudder steers a ship moving through the water. That is their great and (so far as I can ascertain from scientific colleagues) their only function.

An unfeathered arrow flies wide of the mark. This has been proved by an elaborate series of tests, of which an account may be found in the chapter on the Arrow, by Colonel Walrond, in the *Archery* volume of the Badminton Library (chap. xviii). Here is a summary of what he writes of unfeathered arrows:

(a) A 'bob-tailed' arrow jumps off the bow to the left, recovers itself and then flies to the right of the mark.

(b) A 'cheded' arrow flies more to the left, partially recovers and then goes to the left.

(c) A 'parallel' arrow does not jump as it leaves the bow and goes fairly straight up to a range of 60 yards; then anyhow.

(d) A 'barrelled' arrow does not jump, goes fairly straight up to 30 yards; then to the right.

From this we may understand the meaning of *ἄπτερος μῦθος*; it is a speech which does not, like *ἔπεια πτερόεντα*, fly straight to the comprehension of the listener, but swerves away from it. The phrase *τὴ δ' ἄπτερος ἐπλεγο μῦθος* occurs four times in Homer, each time in the *Odyssey*, and it always means the same thing, namely that the import of the speech, or its full import, was not perceived by the listener. When the expression is first used *ρ* 57 the situation is this. Odysseus, who has revealed himself to Telemachus and so far to no one else, has come to the city in his beggar's disguise. Telemachus, who has a plan for introducing him into the palace, tells his mother that he has sent Peiraeus to fetch him. 'So he spake,' says the poet, *τὴ δ' ἄπτερος ἐπλεγο μῦθος*—the point of his remark escaped her, *she* not being in the secret. (Observe that this explanation of the phrase gives *τὴ δ'* the emphasis it should have from its position.) In *τ* 29 we have the following state of affairs. Odysseus and Telemachus have arranged, as part of their plot against the Suitors, to remove the armour in the *μέγαρον* to the *θάλαμος*. Telemachus then asks Eurycleia to shut the

women up until the removal is accomplished and at the same time brings forward his disguised father with the remark that he will not allow a stranger to live at his charges without doing something to earn his keep. Eurycleia naturally can make nothing of all this: so Homer adds $\tau\bar{y}\ \delta'\ \ddot{\alpha}\pi\tau\bar{e}\bar{p}\oslash\ \dot{\epsilon}\pi\lambda\bar{e}\bar{t}\bar{o}\ \mu\bar{v}\bar{\theta}\bar{o}\bar{s}$. In ϕ 380 f. the Swine-herd, obeying orders, conveys to Eurycleia the command of Telemachus that she shut the doors of the $\mu\bar{e}\gamma\bar{a}\bar{p}\bar{o}\bar{v}$ and pay no attention to any sounds that may come from it of blows and groaning. To the Nurse, who was not in the plot, such an order was merely mysterious. Again in the last instance χ 398 the killing is over, and Telemachus, going to Eurycleia, says 'My father calls you, to tell you somewhat.' What? Eurycleia had no idea. The speech of Telemachus flew wild; did not lodge itself in her understanding.

Thus Walter Headlam in his note on $\ddot{\alpha}\pi\tau\bar{e}\bar{p}\oslash\ \bar{f}\bar{a}\bar{t}\bar{i}\bar{s}$ in his posthumous edition of the *Agamemnon* 288 says: 'It should be observed that when the phrase $\tau\bar{y}\ \delta'\ \ddot{\alpha}\pi\tau\bar{e}\bar{p}\oslash\ \dot{\epsilon}\pi\lambda\bar{e}\bar{t}\bar{o}\ \mu\bar{v}\bar{\theta}\bar{o}\bar{s}$ occurs in the *Odyssey*, it seems always to denote a certain obscurity in the speaker's words, which causes them to fall short of the hearer's intelligence.' And he proceeds to analyse the four examples of the phrase much as I, with less brevity, have analysed them.

Now it is certain that $\ddot{\alpha}\pi\tau\bar{e}\bar{p}\oslash\ \bar{f}\bar{a}\bar{t}\bar{i}\bar{s}$ is a synonym of $\ddot{\alpha}\pi\tau\bar{e}\bar{p}\oslash\ \mu\bar{v}\bar{\theta}\bar{o}\bar{s}$ and all the trouble caused to scholars by the phrase in Aeschylus arises from the fact that they did not realise or perhaps understand the metaphor involved. If Aeschylus never handled a bow himself, he must have seen many a Bowman in action. At any rate he lived in an age when archery was still practised in Greek lands and the lore of the archer was not yet forgotten. Aeschylus would know how an unfeathered arrow behaves, and so he knew what Homer meant by an $\ddot{\alpha}\pi\tau\bar{e}\bar{p}\oslash\ \mu\bar{v}\bar{\theta}\bar{o}\bar{s}$. It is we who have misunderstood and charged our ignorance upon Aeschylus. But, the image of the random-flying arrow once comprehended, the meaning of $\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\bar{\lambda}'\ \bar{\eta}\ \sigma'\ \dot{\epsilon}\pi\bar{v}\bar{a}\bar{r}\bar{e}\bar{v}\ \tau\bar{u}\bar{s}$ $\ddot{\alpha}\pi\tau\bar{e}\bar{p}\oslash\ \bar{f}\bar{a}\bar{t}\bar{i}\bar{s}$ becomes perfectly clear and appropriate. A woman like Clytemnestra, the Chorus think, should not listen to mere aimless rumour.

In later days when Greeks, or at least scholars, did not know why arrows have feathers, untenable and even absurd explanations were proffered for the meaning of $\dot{\epsilon}\pi\bar{e}\bar{a}\ \pi\bar{t}\bar{e}\bar{r}\bar{o}\bar{e}\bar{v}\bar{a}\bar{t}\bar{a}$ and $\ddot{\alpha}\pi\tau\bar{e}\bar{p}\oslash\ \mu\bar{v}\bar{\theta}\bar{o}\bar{s}$. The recurrent $\tau\bar{y}\ \delta'\ \ddot{\alpha}\pi\tau\bar{e}\bar{p}\oslash\ \dot{\epsilon}\pi\lambda\bar{e}\bar{t}\bar{o}\ \mu\bar{v}\bar{\theta}\bar{o}\bar{s}$ was generally explained in one of two ways. (a) It was taken to mean that the speech did not fly away from the listener but remained fixed in her mind. (b) It meant that the person addressed did not answer. This second explanation, which is accepted by Monro (*Homer's Odyssey* XIII-XXIV on p 57) and other good scholars, rests upon an interpretation of $\dot{\epsilon}\pi\bar{e}\bar{a}\ \pi\bar{t}\bar{e}\bar{r}\bar{o}\bar{e}\bar{v}\bar{a}\bar{t}\bar{a}$ which robs that phrase of half its meaning. For Monro, who sees that $\ddot{\alpha}\pi\tau\bar{e}\bar{p}\oslash\ \mu\bar{v}\bar{\theta}\bar{o}\bar{s}$ must be opposed to $\dot{\epsilon}\pi\bar{e}\bar{a}\ \pi\bar{t}\bar{e}\bar{r}\bar{o}\bar{e}\bar{v}\bar{a}\bar{t}\bar{a}$, translates $\dot{\epsilon}\pi\bar{e}\bar{a}\ \pi\bar{t}\bar{e}\bar{r}\bar{o}\bar{e}\bar{v}\bar{a}\bar{t}\bar{a}$ by 'words uttered,' thus losing the whole force of the metaphor drawn from the feathered arrow. Consequently his view that $\ddot{\alpha}\pi\tau\bar{e}\bar{p}\oslash\ \mu\bar{v}\bar{\theta}\bar{o}\bar{s}$ means an unuttered speech is deprived of the support on which it rested. Moreover it is refuted by Aeschylus, whose $\ddot{\alpha}\pi\tau\bar{e}\bar{p}\oslash\ \bar{f}\bar{a}\bar{t}\bar{i}\bar{s}$ is admitted to be a synonym for the Homeric phrase. To suggest that an 'unuttered rumour' has fed someone fat is, in spite of Verrall quoting Sidgwick (*ad loc.*), not even an oxymoron; it is a contradiction in terms. Besides we have seen what $\ddot{\alpha}\pi\tau\bar{e}\bar{p}\oslash\ \bar{f}\bar{a}\bar{t}\bar{i}\bar{s}$ really means. With respect to the other explanation (a) perhaps no one would defend it. Without pressing the question how the speech, which had flown to its auditors, came to lose its wings, one may simply deny that the Greek words mean what the explanation wants them to mean.

Quite a different interpretation was suggested by certain scholiasts and lexicographers of late antiquity [references in Ebeling *Lex. Hom. s.v. $\ddot{\alpha}\pi\tau\bar{e}\bar{p}\oslash$*] and revived by Walter Headlam. According to this view $\ddot{\alpha}\pi\tau\bar{e}\bar{p}\oslash$ may be taken as equivalent to $\pi\bar{t}\bar{e}\bar{r}\bar{o}\bar{e}\bar{v}\bar{a}\bar{t}\bar{a}$. ' $\ddot{\alpha}\pi\tau\bar{e}\bar{p}\oslash\ \bar{f}\bar{a}\bar{t}\bar{i}\bar{s}$, of which fantastic explanations have been given, means a wing-swift rumour' [Headlam on *Ag.* 288]. To justify this rendering $\ddot{\alpha}\pi\tau\bar{e}\bar{p}\oslash\ \tau\bar{a}\bar{r}\bar{e}\bar{v}\bar{a}\bar{t}\bar{a}$ is quoted. But in this common phrase the adjective is explained by the noun. To say

of a ho
but it is
An $\ddot{\alpha}\pi\tau\bar{e}\bar{p}\oslash$
swift, le
swift ru
merely
they we
means 'Winged
that the
feathere
circums
he coule
having
 $\ddot{\alpha}\pi\tau\bar{e}\bar{p}\oslash$
the Pro

On
thing th

forward his live at his can make the Swine- that she come from in order was , and Tele- t. What? ge itself in s edition of $\hat{\eta}$ δ' ἄπτερος urity in the e.' And he evity, have and all the t that they ylus never . At any d the lore unfeathered It is we the image $\hat{\epsilon}$ πιάνειν τις temnestra, rows have thing of $\hat{\epsilon}$ πεια s generally did not fly the person by Monro an inter- For Monro, a πτερόντα from the unuttered refuted by phr. of Verrall in terms. The other ex- question how may simply . and lexico- and revived equivalent to , means a οφ τάχει is . To say of a horse, for instance, that it galloped with wingless speed is perfectly intelligible, but it is intelligible only in a phrase of that kind; the $\tau\acute{a}χē$ makes all the difference. An ἄπτερος ἵππος could only mean a horse without wings; it could not mean a wing-swift, let alone a winged, horse. In the same way ἄπτερος φάτης cannot mean a wing swift rumour. The fact is that some of the scholars who had to gloss ἄπτερος μύθος merely supposed that it meant much the same as $\hat{\epsilon}$ πεια πτερόντα because they did not understand it. They were guessing, just as modern scholars have guessed, because they were ignorant of archery. When a classical author uses the word ἄπτερος it means 'wingless' or 'featherless' and nothing else. *Nike Apteros* did not mean the Winged Victory. So when Herodotus in his catalogue of the Persian forces says that the Lycians had ὀυστὸν καλαμίνοντος ἄπτερον *vii*, 92 he means that they used unfeathered arrows. The circumstance, if true, is odd; but it is just the oddity of the circumstance that leads Herodotus to mention it. Unmilitary as he may have been, he could not have proposed to tell the world that Lycian arrows were remarkable in having feathers. It seems therefore that we must reject Headlam's interpretation of ἄπτερος and with it his conjecture, recorded by Mr. George Thomson in his edition of the *Prometheus Vinctus* 360, ἄπτερος μόρος.

On the other hand everything becomes clear when we take into account something that is familiar to every mathematician and engineer and practising archer.

J. A. K. THOMSON.

PLATO'S THEISM.

In the ontology of the *Philebus* (23c-30b) *νοῦς* is the *αίτια τῆς συμμίξεως*, the cause (called also *τὸ δημιουργοῦν* and *τὸ ποιοῦν*) that combines *πέρας* with *ἀπειρον* into the mixture called *γένερις εἰς οὐσίαν* or *γεγενημένη οὐσία*: correspondingly in the *Timaeus* the Demiurge, *ὁ ἀριστος τῶν αἰτιῶν* (29a), brings order into unordered chaos by 'Forms and Numbers' (*διεσχηματίσατο εἰδεῖς καὶ ἀριθμοῖς* 53b). In the *Philebus* the Universe has a Soul, discriminated from the *νοῦς* that causes it (30b, where it is argued that we cannot imagine that the *αίτια*, while it provides our human bodies with a soul, does not 'devise that which is fairest and most precious' in the body of the Universe: *οὐ γάρ πον δοκοῦμέν γε . . . ἐν τούτοις δ' οὐκ ἀρα μεμηχανῆσθαι τὴν τῶν καλλίστων καὶ τιμωτάτων φ' σιν*): correspondingly in the *Timaeus* the Demiurge devises (*ἐμηχανήσατο* 34c) a soul of the world, as well as its body.

We can hardly avoid drawing the conclusions that (a) the Demiurge is to be identified with *νοῦς*, i.e. he is the 'mythical' equivalent of *νοῦς*, (b) *νοῦς* is a more ultimate principle than the *ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου*. What I want to consider is how these conclusions square with that section of *Laws* X in which Plato works out a theological argument designed to refute atheists. It is often said, and is probably the orthodox view, (1) that *ψυχή* is there treated as an ultimate principle of things and (2) that there is a hierarchy of *ψυχά* amongst which one *ἀριστη ψυχή* is God in the sense of a single spiritual Being who rules the world with providential care and wisdom. E.g. Prof. Taylor says (*Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* p. 82) 'God, in the dialogues, is the *ἀριστη ψυχή* . . . the Demiurge of the *Timaeus* is exactly the "best *ψυχή*" which is said in the *Laws* to be the source of the great orderly cosmic movements, that is, he is God, and if we are to use the word God in the sense it has in Plato's natural theology, the only God there is'.¹

A careful reading of the *Laws* will, I think, convince us that there is just the same relation implied between the World-soul and *νοῦς* as in the two earlier dialogues, and further that Plato says nothing to warrant the conception of a hierarchy of souls culminating in a single supreme soul. It is commonly (though not universally) admitted nowadays that Plutarch was wrong in finding in the *Laws* a single 'Devil' or evil World-soul; what has not, I think, been seen, or at all events not emphatically and prominently stated, is that there is no single God or best World-soul either to be found amongst *ψυχαί*.

The problem is complicated at the outset by Plato's very wide application of *θεός*. As M. Diès says,² many things are called 'Gods' or 'divine': the Demiurge is a *θεός*, so is the created Universe (*Tim.* 34b, 92c), so are the stars and planets (*Tim.* 40d) and the gods of popular theology (*Tim.* 40e), and the (possible) plurality of good souls in *Laws* X; the adjective *θεός* is commonly applied to the Forms, and if the reading at *Tim.* 37c *τῶν ἀιδίων θεῶν γεγονός ἀγαλμα* is to be kept, the Forms which are comprised in the *νοητὸν σώμα* are actually called gods.³

¹ Cf. Burnet, *Greek Philosophy* Part I, p. 335.

² *Autour de Platon*, p. 555. 'Tout est dieu ou divin chez ce trop divin Platon.'

³ On the assumption, which seems universal, that *ἀγαλμα* is a mere synonym of *εἰκὼν*. But Prof. Cornford suggests to me—and he is surely right—that the *οὐρανός*, being as yet only a framework of circles or movements, is called

the *ἀγαλμα* of the stars and planets (*οὐράνιος θεός*) which are subsequently to be set in the framework: for the *ἀγαλμα* of a god is a token or assurance of his presence to the worshipper. This appears to be meant by Proclus when he explains *ἀγαλμα* as that which 'is filled with deity' (*in Tim.* III p. 4, Diehl *καθ' ὅλον ἔαυτὸν ὁ κόσμος πληροῦται θεότητος καὶ διὰ τοῦτο*

W
God in
that ma
dogmati
the sou
not of w
to the f
reason t
two criti
but as s

No
out *ψυχ*
have, ye
in the I
τρώτοι
ἀρα . .
ψυχὴν .
ἢν ἔχει
γενομένη
have ge
λεγόμενα
ληφεν .
mentato
interpre
as equi
follows
the sou
p. 567)
tout ce

Th
anyone
Book X
substitu
but it i
itself or
which a
Gerth I
κάλλιστ
μεγίστη
pages la
κατασκε
ἐκφείξη

Sou
course
any mor
in time
whose
sistency
having

The *νοητ*
ment, bu

What then shall be our criteria for deciding who, or what, if anything, is Plato's God in the sense in which the word is used by Theists? What is it, if anything, that makes Plato what we call a Theist? I propose to answer this question very dogmatically: 'God' must (1) have independent, not derivative, existence, and (2) be the source, or cause, of all in the Universe that is good, orderly and rational, but not of what is bad, disorderly and irrational. For this second criterion I may appeal to the first of the *tύποι περὶ θεολογίας* in *Rep.* 379b-c, a principle which there is no reason to suppose that Plato ever abandoned. I do not of course suggest that these two criteria furnish a definition of God: they are no more than *ὅροι*, marks or criteria; but as such I hardly think they can be contested.

Now in virtue of (1) we must, if Plato's language is to be taken seriously, rule out *ψυχή*, or an individual *ψυχή*, for *ψυχή* is again and again asserted to be, or to have, *γένεσις*. Nobody will think of denying this as far as the *Timaeus* is concerned; in the *Laws* we have 892c εἰ δὲ φανήσεται ψυχὴ πρῶτον, οὐ πῦρ οὐδὲ ἄλλο, ψυχὴ δ' ἐν τρώτοις γε γενημένη, σχεδὸν ὀρθότατα λέγοιτ' ἀνεῖν διαφερόντως φύσει: 896A ὀρθῶς ἀρά . . . εἰρηκότες ἀνείμεν ψυχὴν μὲν προτέραν γεγονέναι τόποις οὐδέν . . . 892A ψυχὴν . . . ἡγονέναι κινδύνεύοντι μὲν ὀλίγον σύμπαντες οὖλον τε δὲ τυγχάνει καὶ δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει τῶν τε ἀλλων αὐτῆς πέρι καὶ δὴ καὶ γενέσις, σωμάτων ἐμπροσθεν πάντων γενομένη . . . In *Laws* XII, where the religious doctrine of X is recapitulated, we have 967D οὐκ ἔστιν ποτὲ γενέσιθαι βεβαίως θεοσεβῆ θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα, ὃς ἀν μὴ τὰ λεγόμενα ταῦτα νῦν δύν λαβει, ψυχὴ τε ὡς ἔστιν πρερβάτων ἀπάντων ὅσα γονῆς μετεληφεν . . . In this last passage the word *γονή* seems to have disquieted the commentators (although it means no more than *γένεσις*) to such an extent that they interpret in a linguistically impossible fashion: England 'would take the superlative as equivalent to a strong English comparative—"far older than all"'; and Taylor follows him by translating 'until he has grasped the two truths we are now affirming, the soul's dateless anteriority to all things generable . . .' Similarly Diès (*op. cit.* p. 567) with reference to this passage says 'L'Ame, d'ailleurs, n'est antérieure qu'à tout ce qui "participe à la génération"'.

The words can in fact only mean 'eldest of all things that are generated'. Why anyone should feel troubled by this, in view of the passages I have quoted from Book X, is hard to understand. But let me substantiate the linguistic point. The substitution of superlative + genitive for comparative + genitive is a common idiom, but it is always so used as to leave no ambiguity, for the genitive is always such, in itself or in virtue of some appended word, as to make it clear that the class *A* with which *x* is brought into relation does not include *x*. The examples given in Kühner-Gerth II 1 p. 23 all illustrate this principle: I need only quote Soph. *Ant.* 100 καλλιστον τῶν προτέρων φάσ, Thuc. I 1 ἀξιολογώτατον τῶν προγεγενημένων, *id.* I 10 μεγίστην τῶν πρὸ αὐτῆς. In Homer the idiom is very common with ἀλλων. A few pages later in this same book of the *Laws* we have 969A η . . . κλέος ἀρρή μέγιστον κατασκευάσας αὐτὴν ὀρθῶς, η το γε ἀνδρεύτατος εἶναι δοκεῖν τῶν ὕστερον ἐπιγεγομένων οὐκ ἐκφεύγη ποτέ.

Soul then is a *γένεσις* or a *γεγονός*, or 'participates in birth'. That does not of course mean that it is created in time, that there was ever a time when no soul was, any more than the emphatic *γέγονε* of *Tim.* 28B means that the Universe was created in time. The meaning in both cases is that they are derivative existents, things whose being depends on something more ultimate. Hence there is no real inconsistency with *Phaedrus* 245D and E, where *ψυχή* is said to be *ἀγένητον* in the sense of having no beginning of its existence.

ἀγαλμά ἔστι καθ' ὅλον ἔαυτον τῶν νοητῶν θεῶν. θεῶν to mean the heavenly bodies in view of The νοητοί θεοί are of course a Neoplatonist fig- 40B, where the fixed stars are called ξύλα θεῖα καὶ μέντα. ment, but there is no difficulty in taking διάστικτα.

The reason why scholars have disregarded, or explained away, this attribution of $\gammaένεσις$ to $\psiνχή$ is doubtless that they have assumed that the god or gods whose existence *Laws* X sets out to prove is or are an ultimate principle or principles. But we must remember that Plato is not concerned to give us the whole of his metaphysics, or even of his philosophy of religion, in the *Laws*; his object is to lay down the necessary minimum of philosophical doctrine required for a sound basis of religion and morality; and from that point of view it was not necessary to go into the difficult question of the relation of $\nuόν$ to the Universe, or (what is the same thing) the relation of $\nuόν$ to $\psiνχή$, the principle of movement in the Universe. Indeed it would have been unreasonable to expect Cleinias and Megillus, or the citizen body to whom the 'preambles' to the laws are addressed, to follow him if he had. As *Timaeus* says (28c) $\tauόν μέν οὖν ποιητήν καὶ πατέρα τούδε τοῦ παντός εἴρειν τε ἔργον καὶ ἔνροντα εἰς πάντας δόνυτον λέγειν$. Why should that be 'impossible' in the *Timaeus* if it can be done by straightforward scientific argument in the *Laws*?

What then, precisely, does the argument of *Laws* X establish? This, that all the processes of the physical Universe are dependent upon, and controlled by, non-physical processes or movements, that is by souls, some good some bad. It is not decided whether there is one good soul or many, nor whether there is one bad soul or many, but merely that there must be at least two souls, one good and one bad. It is not said that the good soul or souls control or rule over the bad soul or souls; but it is laid down (897c-898c) that the regular movements of the heaven and 'all that is in it' (viz. the stars, sun, moon and planets) are controlled by $\eta\; \deltaρίστη\; \psiνχή$ (897c), or by 'one soul, or more than one, possessing all excellence' (898c). Here is no warrant for attributing to Plato the doctrine of a single supreme deity; $\tauόν \deltaρίστην \psiνχήν$, both times that the words are used (897c6, 898c4), must mean, as England has seen, 'the best kind of soul'.¹ At the most, he regards it as only possible that there may be only one 'best soul', and he almost goes out of his way to underline his doubt, or his unconcern, by repeating the words $\muίαν \eta\; \piλείον$, which he had used in reference to soul as a whole at 896e, in reference to *good* soul at 898c.² And at the end of this section of the argument (899b) all that is claimed to have been established is that 'a soul or souls' are the causes of the movements of the heavenly bodies, and so of the 'years, months and seasons', so that we are justified in saying (with Thales) that 'all things are full of gods'. If this is Plato's complete philosophy of religion, we must believe that he was either indifferent to, or found it impossible to answer, the question of one God or many Gods. That is surely not easy to believe, though some scholars appear to believe it; if the *Timaeus* myth means anything about God, it surely means that he is one and only one. However, whether we believe this or not, it is certainly not the case that *Laws* X asserts the doctrine of one God, viz. the best soul.

It appears then, from the evidence of *Philebus*, *Timaeus* and *Laws*, that $\psiνχή$ does not satisfy our first criterion. Does it satisfy our second? At first sight it would seem that it does. The movements belonging to $\psiνχή$ itself—the $\piρωτοτυργοί κινήσεις$ contrasted with the $\deltaεντροτυργοί$ at *Laws* 897a—include wish, deliberation, tendency ($\epsilonπιμελείσθαι$), true and false judgment, love and hate, etc.; and the best kind of soul is said $\epsilonπιμελείσθαι τού κόσμου παντός$. But the Stranger is careful to make it clear

¹ The phrase is in fact a mere variant of $\tauό φρένιμον καὶ ἀρετής πλήρες$ (sc. $\psiνχής γένος$) 897b.

² The astronomical theory behind this passage is difficult, if not impossible, to determine. By leaving open the question whether there is only one, or more than one, orderly or beneficent soul, he seems to be deliberately avoiding the

settlement of the problem whether the revolution of the circle of the fixed stars does or does not carry round with it those of the planets—a doctrine implied in the myth of *Rep.* X. I do not think there is anything in the text to suggest that the bad or maleficent souls have anything to do with planetary movements.

that go
that is
goodness
doctrine
clearly
and ψ
 $αίρια$ 'd
 $\tauή τού$
 $αίριας δ$
 $τε τή δ$
the Un
In othe
and go
nature
earlier
good, d

So
 $\nuόν$, as
told bo
ζοc σo
ηρισκε
it is ar
 $\nuόν$ an
not of
langua
compar
 $καλούμε$
course
to esta
Philebu
are we
God or
and the

To
that he
this co
ality o
I can
person

¹ Inci
sage gi
with hi
partial
p. 550:
le Dém
excusab
sentent
Mais n
en tant
cellence
words
alone, s
built, a
copy to

that good soul is discriminated from bad soul by its 'association' with *νοῦς* (897B); that is to say, Soul in its own nature is ethically neutral: the good soul owes its goodness to *νοῦς*, the bad soul its badness to its' lack of *νοῦς*. Now if we set this doctrine beside two closely similar passages of the *Philebus* and *Timaeus*, we can see clearly enough what Plato means us to understand to be the relation between *νοῦς* and *ψυχή*. I have already quoted the passage, *Phil.* 30B, where it is said that the *αἰτία* 'devises' *ψυχή* in the Universe; now at 30D the question is put οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἐρεῖς φύσει βασιλικὴν μὲν *ψυχήν*, βασιλικὸν δὲ νοῦν ἐγγίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας δύναμιν: and at *Tim.* 30B we have δεῖ λέγειν τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ζῶν ἐμψυχον ἔννοιν τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ πρόνοιαν. Reason then, as well as Soul, is found in the Universe and is due to the action of God, who is himself identified with Reason. In other words, the Universe is rational and good in so far as God's rational nature and goodness are imparted to it: it is irrational and bad in so far as God's rational nature and goodness are not wholly imparted to it. The same doctrine is expressed earlier in the *Timaeus* (29E), where it is said that the Demiurge, because he was good, desired all things to be so far as possible (*ὅτι μάλιστα*) like to himself.¹

So far, then, the three dialogues have been found consistent in discriminating *νοῦς*, as an ultimate principle, from *ψυχή* as a derived principle. We are, however, told both in *Philebus* and *Timaeus* that *νοῦς* cannot 'arise' apart from a soul: *Phil.* 30C σοφία μήν καὶ νοῦς ἀνεύ *ψυχῆς* οὐκ ἀν ποτε γενούσθην, *Tim.* 30B λογισάμενος οὐν τῷριςκεν . . . νοῦν . . . χωρὶς *ψυχῆς* ἀδύνατον παραγενέσθαι τῷ. Again, in *Sophist* 249A it is argued that if τὸ παντελῶς ὄν has *νοῦς* it must have *ζωή*, and that it can only have *νοῦς* and *ζωή* in a soul.² [But in all these passages Plato is speaking of the Universe, not of its 'Creator' or cause, of that which has *νοῦς*, not of that which is *νοῦς*.³] The language of the *Sophist*, although it makes no reference to *νοῦς* as cause, is perfectly compatible with the distinction drawn in *Phil.* 28D between τὰ ξύμπαντα καὶ τόδε τὸ καλούμενον δλον and the νοῦς καὶ φρόνησις τις θαυμαστὴ συντάττοντα which 'steers its course'. It is not relevant to the argument of *Sophist* 249A, the object of which is to establish the existence of *κίνησις* as an element in reality, to anticipate what the *Philebus* and *Timaeus* are to tell us of the cause behind the Universe. And not only are we not entitled, on the strength of these passages, to infer that the *νοῦς* which is God or cause must be 'in a soul', but we shall make havoc of the *Philebus* ontology and the *Timaeus* cosmology if we do.

To this it may be objected that Plato's God is hereby deprived of personality, that he is no longer a living being, but has become an 'impersonal thought'; indeed this conclusion seems to have been drawn by Zeller,⁴ who maintains that the personality of God is a question which hardly presented itself to Plato in a definite form. I can only reply that Plato may well have wished to attribute to God a mode of personality, and of life, different from that known to our experience, but have wisely

¹ Incidentally it may be added that this passage gives no ground for identifying the Demiurge with his model, the *νοητὸς ζῶος*, even in the partial identification adopted by Diès (*op. cit.* p. 550: 'Allons-nous donc identifier totalement le Démurge et le Modèle? Nous serions très excusables de les identifier en tant qu'ils représentent ou symbolisent la Divinité suprême. Mais nous sommes contraints de les distinguer en tant qu'ils représentent l'un, l'Objet par excellence, l'autre, le Sujet par excellence'. The words *ὅτι μάλιστα παραπλήσια ἐντρόπη*, on which alone, so far as I can see, this doctrine has been built, are not intended to suggest the relation of copy to model; they are equivalent merely to

κατὰ δύναμιν δριστα.

² ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀμφότερα ἐνέργητα αὐτῷ λέγομεν, οὐ μὴν ἐν *ψυχῇ* γε φθίσουμεν αὐτὸν ζήσειν οὐτέ:—καὶ τινὲς ἀν θεον ἔχοι τρόπον;

³ Cf. Zeller⁴ p. 715, Note 1: 'Es handelt sich hierbei (i.e. *Tim.* 30B, *Phil.* 30C) nicht um die Vernunft in ihrem überweltlichen Sein, sondern um die Vernunft wiefern sie dem Weltganzen (mythisch ausgedrückt: der Natur des Zeus) inwohnt, von dieser innerweltlichen Vernunft aber wird die überweltliche noch unterschieden, wenn es heißt, Zeus besitze eine königliche Seele und einen königlichen Verstand διὰ τὴν αἰτίας δύναμιν'.

⁴ Zeller⁴ p. 714 f.

refrained from the attempt to define it; and although the activity of God certainly meant for him something very different from what it meant for Aristotle, he might well have agreed with the latter's words (*Met. A* 1072B 26) *καὶ ζωὴ δέ γ' ἀπάρχει* (sc. *τῷ θεῷ*): *ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωὴ, ἔκεινος δὲ η ἐνέργεια.*

Plato's meaning is, as I understand it, that if God is to impart his goodness to the world—and to do so is an essential part of his goodness—if Reason is to penetrate this world of *κίνησις* and *γένεσις*, it must be through *ψυχή*, the principle of movement.¹ It is in the regular movements of the heavenly bodies that Plato finds the closest approximation to the activity of God, just as Aristotle was to find it in the eternal revolution of the *πρώτος οὐρανός*. Plato calls the activity of *νοῦς* a *κίνησις*, but he seems on the verge of formulating Aristotle's distinction between the minimal *κίνησις* of the First Heaven and the *ἀκινητία* of the *πρώτον κινοῦν* in the passage (*Laws* 897D-898B) where he discusses the question 'What is the nature of the *κίνησις* of *νοῦς*?' The answer that he gives is that we can only describe it in an image: 'let us beware of creating a darkness at noonday for ourselves by gazing, so to say, direct at the sun as we give our answer, as though we could hope to attain adequate vision and perception of wisdom with mortal eyes. It will be the safer course to turn our gaze on an image of the object of our quest'; and the conclusion is that 'if we say that intelligence and movement in one place are both like the revolution of a well-made globe, in moving regularly and uniformly in one compass about one centre, and in one sense, according to one single law and plan, we need have no fear of proving unskilled artists in imagery'.²

The question which Plato is asking here is that which Aristotle attempts to answer by his doctrine of God as *νόος νοήσεως*, namely what God is *in himself*, regarded in abstraction from that outgoing activity which is his in relation to the Universe. He cannot, or will not, answer it directly, just as he cannot, or will not, directly describe the Form of Good in *Rep. VI*.³ Nor is it a question that need trouble the legislator of the *Laws*; his concern is that his citizens should recognize the divine as revealed in the Universe.

I do not propose to raise here the much-discussed question of the relation of Plato's God to the Form of Good, or to the Forms in general. Whatever be the precise philosophical meaning of calling the Forms the *παραδείγματα* to which the Demiurge looks, I believe with Prof. Taylor that there is no warrant for identifying him with the Forms, or for regarding them as his thoughts. It seems to me probable that Theism became part of Plato's philosophy, as distinct from his religious belief at a later period than that of the *Republic*; but however that may be, my main purpose in referring to this question of the nature of the *κίνησις* of *νοῦς* is to point out that it confirms, as seriously meant, the discrimination of *νοῦς* from *ψυχή* and the identification of God, not with Soul or 'the best Soul', but with Reason. It is, in short, *νοῦς*, and *νοῦς* alone, that satisfies both the criteria that we put forward.

The importance of our conclusion can be perhaps best realized by a comparison with Aristotle's theology expounded in *Metaphysics A*. Aristotle's God is external to the Universe which depends on him, and is connected with it only inasmuch as he is the object of its desire (*ώς ἐρώμενον*). Plato's God is external too, in the sense that he is the perfect spiritual activity implied by, but nowhere fully revealed in, the Universe: at the same time he is immanent, in the sense that the life of the Universe

¹ Cf. Proclus in *Tim. I* p. 402 (Diehl) *εἰ δρα δεῖ τὸ πᾶν ἐννοεῖν γενέσθαι, δεῖ καὶ ψυχῆς ἀπόδοσιν γάρ ἔστιν αὐτὴν τοῦ νοῦ, καὶ δι' αὐτῆς ὁ νοῦς ἐμφαινεται τοῖς δύκοις τοῦ παντός, οὐχ δι' δεῖται τῆς ψυχῆς ὁ νοῦς· οὕτω γὰρ ἀτιμότερος εἰν τῆς ψυχῆς· ἀλλ' δι' τὰ σώματα δεῖται τῆς ψυχῆς εἰ μέλλοι (?) μελλεῖ*

νοῦς μεθέξειν.

² Prof. Taylor's translation.

³ In *Tim. 42B* he is content to say of the Demiurge, when his work of creation is finished, *ἔμενεν ἐπ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ τρόπον ήθει.*

is his life
that go
with ψ
princip
perfecti

In
I have
system
imman
Each I
part of
nature

SID

is *his* life just because his activity is necessarily (unlike that of Aristotle's God) one that goes outside himself, is necessarily a projection of himself. To identify him with $\psi\chi\dot{\imath}$ would be to deny his transcendence or externality, since $\psi\chi\dot{\imath}$ is a principle operative only in the realm of $\kappa\iota\eta\sigma\iota s$ and $\gamma\acute{e}\nu\sigma\iota s$: and thereby to deny his perfection, since perfection does not and cannot belong to $\kappa\iota\eta\sigma\iota s$ and $\gamma\acute{e}\nu\sigma\iota s$.

In declining to raise here the problem of the identity of God with the Form of Good I have of course declined the attempt to fit Plato's theology into his metaphysical system; but I think it is not unhelpful to add, in conclusion, that his transcendent-immanent God is a conception very similar to his transcendent-immanent Forms. Each Form is the Form of its particulars: though external to the particulars it is part of its nature to be imperfectly represented in them, just as it is part of God's nature to be imperfectly represented in the Universe.

R. HACKFORTH.

SIDNEY SUSSEX COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

be found
quite o
pp. 11-
complet
abnorm
to each
abnorm
altogeth
abnorm
present
tion tha
we find
maintai
not kno

Bu
single p
Sappho
for us t
on to ad
It might
parted
dozen v
of non-
η2 App
of abno

The
Bu
mality
Alcaeu
for our
abnorm
sufficie
Abnorm
natural
About
not; an
it must

Th
v. 5 συν
η2
αλ
v. 6 ιερ
po
a
an
th
πε
v. 7 ένι
of
1 The
poem :

THE AUTHORSHIP OF SAPPHO β_2 (LOBEL).

Two papyri ascribe this poem to Sappho (P. Oxy. 1232 and P. Oxy. 2076); Athenaeus (XI. 460D) attributes v. 10 to her; Philostratos (*Imag.* II. 1, p. 62) attributes v. 30 to her. In three of these places the poem is assigned to her Second Book. Perhaps it is true that hardly any other poem of Sappho is so often ascribed to her by antiquity.¹ This admittedly proves no more than that the poem was certainly handed down in the Sappho-book in antiquity: it does not necessarily prove its authenticity. But at least it settles the burden of proof on those who would deny that Sappho wrote it. Now it has been thought that certain arguments can be employed to justify the overthrow of ancient testimonies. If, however, these arguments should prove to be fallacious or insufficient, the poem will automatically be reascribed to Sappho.

Wilamowitz was the first² to deny that she wrote it. It is at least surprising to find that his only objections were the short datives in v. 12 and v. 21, the epic corruption in v. 5, and his belief 'in der breiten Ausführung einen Ton zu spüren der ihr [Sappho] fremd ist.' Desultory references to the problem in Körte (*Archiv für Papyrusforschung*, 1923, p. 126 and 1931, p. 46), Jurenka (*Wiener Studien* XXXVI, pp. 214 sqq.), Aly (P.W.K. s.v. Sappho, p. 2381), Diehl (*Suppl. lyr.*³, p. 40), H. Fraenkel (*Nachr. d. Ges. d. Wiss. zu Göttingen*, 1924, p. 64), and Sitzler (Bursian, 1919, pp. 34 sqq., esp. p. 53) are almost entirely confined to Wilamowitz's first two arguments, though Sitzler does better than the others in observing that the poem represents 'eine neue Art von Gedichten der Sappho, für die wir die Gesetze erst kennen lernen müssen.'

Certain minor arguments can be answered without delay. To Wilamowitz's aesthetic criticism we may reply, as Castiglioni⁴ suggests, that his belief is too subjective to be of much value to the inquiry, and that it may be mistaken. And if it is objected that this poem alone is composed in lines instead of stanzas, we may answer that composition by the line was probably a regular feature of the Abnormal Poems; though the others of this class are not long enough for us to form a certain judgment either way.⁴

But the most important argument is the abnormality of the dialect; the poem exhibits many divagations from the Lesbian vernacular. The presence of abnormal forms is not in itself very remarkable, for they occur in other poems of Sappho and occasionally in Alcaeus. But the cumulative effect of the abnormal forms in this poem has been used as an argument against Sappho's authorship. 'It is seen to be full of usages which are alien to Sappho's style. It is true that some of them may

¹ The Antiatticista (Bekk. 108. 22) attributes to Sappho the word *μιόφα*, which occurs in v. 30 of this poem.

² *Neue Jahrb.* XXXIII, 1914, p. 229 sq. Cf. Lobel, 'Αλκαιον μελη, p. xvii, 'β₂ . . . is almost certainly supposititious'; Bowra, *New Chapters in Greek Literature* III, p. 13, 'The poem, then, is not Sappho's.'

³ *Atene e Roma*, XVII, 1914, pp. 224 sqq., esp. p. 247 n. 2, 'I nuovi frammenti di Sappho.'

⁴ Among minor objections to Sappho's authorship, there is one other curious circumstance.—In P. Oxy. 1232, our poem begins at the head of col. ii; now at the foot of col. i there was ap-

parently a blank space equivalent to several lines. Enough papyrus remains on the right-hand side of the foot of col. i to assure us that, if lines of β₂ had been there, we should have been able to see the ends of them. It is suggested (1) that this space contained a note referring to the *Echtheitsproblem* of β₂ (this cannot be disproved; but it is unlikely, since fragments of it should have been visible), (2) that the space was purposely left to separate the 'spurious' β₂ at the end of the Book from the 'genuine' poems which preceded it. This also cannot be disproved; but it is mere speculation.

1 The
poem :

be found in a small group of Sappho's dactylic poems, but the cumulative evidence quite outweighs that consideration' (Bowra, *New Chapters in Greek Literature III*, pp. 11-12). I suggest that this argument is untrue. There are 25 more or less complete lines in β_2 ; of these 17 exhibit abnormalities. The number of these abnormalities is perhaps 23. There is then, on the average, less than one abnormality to each complete line of the poem, and a little more than one abnormality to each abnormal line. The other Abnormal Poems afford scanty evidence; there are altogether less than 9 complete lines (omitting γ 6 App., 4 App., 3 App., wherein abnormality, though probable, is not certainly proved, v. Lobel *A*, p. x), and these present 15 or 16 abnormalities, an average of nearly 2 to each line; a higher proportion than β_2 presents. If then we consider the frequency of abnormal forms in β_2 , we find that it is not as high as in the other Abnormal Poems. Whether these maintained the frequency of abnormal forms which appears in the fragments we do not know.

But, it may be said, different sorts of abnormality are here concentrated in a single poem: abnormal metre, flexion, vocabulary; there is no parallel for this in Sappho. We must answer that none of the other Abnormal Poems is long enough for us to be able to make this judgment; we do not know whether any of them went on to admit several different sorts of abnormality, or adhered to one or two sorts only. It might seem not unreasonable to suppose that if, in any given poem, Sappho departed in two ways from the Lesbian vernacular, she might depart from it in half a dozen ways. And indeed γ 2 App. C admits no less than 4 (perhaps 5) different sorts of non-vernacular licence in 2 lines. It is admittedly not certain that Sappho wrote γ 2 App. C; but γ 2 App. A, which is fairly well attested, presents 2 different sorts of abnormality in the first two lines.

Thus neither frequency nor variety of abnormal forms appears to be unique.

But the most serious problem remains to be solved. Can each sort of abnormality in β_2 be paralleled by abnormalities either elsewhere in Sappho or in Alcaeus? It would be very surprising if each class could, so scanty are the sources for our parallels. And yet parallels for almost everything can be found. Of those abnormalities which can be supported thus, no more need be said: it will be sufficient merely to adduce the parallel. If Sappho wrote *μαλοδροπής* in another Abnormal Poem, she could certainly write *οχλος* and *-τά χρ-* in this poem. But naturally a few peculiarities will remain, for which no exact parallels can be found. About these we shall have to inquire whether they are in themselves justifiable or not; and if they are not, whether their presence is so inexplicable and offensive that it must force us to deny Sappho's authorship.

The Abnormalities of β_2 ; their parallels and explanations:

v. 5 *συνεταιροί αγούσ*':—Epic Correction, v. S. IL 27 *φιλαῖ ησαν*, 28 *ερεβινθοῖ επ' αιονων*, γ 2 App. A *ερενθεταῖ ακρῷ επ' ισδψ*, γ 5 App. *καλᾶ ω χαριεσσα*; Alk. fr. 128 *καὶ αλαθευ*.

v. 6 *ἴέρας*':—Aeolic is *ἴέρας*, Alk. fr. 32, 10.¹ Like some other peculiarities in this poem, it is best explained as due to the influence of an epic theme, which brought a few epic forms with it. Cf. Bacchyl. XII. 100 sqq., where the mention of Aias and Achilleus at once justifies *δέ τε, κλισύγουν*, etc. *ἴέρας* is no more licentious than e.g. Alk.'s Ionic forms, *πολιάτας* (fr. 16b 7, 23a 6), *πόλης* (fr. 25, 18), *πειράτων* (fr. 106, 1).

v. 7 *ἐνί*':—Another Homeric reminiscence; *ἐνί* is not found in Lesbian. Cf. variations of other prepositions, *παρά* (Alk. fr. 23a 10) beside *πάρ*; *κατά* (S. γ 2 App. C 2)

¹ Theocr. XXVIII. 7 *ιερόν*, in an 'Aeolic' about the dialect.
poem: but he has too many strange notions

beside κάτ; περί beside πέρ or πέρρ (it is 'reasonably certain that Sappho and Alcaeus could employ any of the metrically variant forms περί, πέρ, πέρρ without restriction as their convenience demanded,' Lobel *Ap* xxiv). ναυτί:—probably not abnormal; Alk. fr. 148 has νάεσσιν, but it is doubtful whether this is really Aeolic. 'It is likely that both [viz. νάεσσιν and πόδεσσιν, Alk. *Inc. Auct.* 2. 1] are alien to the vernacular,' Lobel *Ap* i; cf. δρυσίν S. β3. 2 App., χερσί δ21(b) 2, πάσι ε4. 6, φρεσί Alk. fr. 23a 9.

v. 8 -τά χρ:—cf. ὥχλος v. 14 infra: μαλόδροτης η2 App. A 1.

v. 9 πορφύρα:—cf. αργύρα v. 10; discussion below. For the hiatus between this line and the next, with a short vowel left open at the end of v. 9 (ἀθύρματά | ἀργύρα) cf. Alk. fr. 50, 7-8, ἐπελάθετό | ὄνηρ in a much stricter system; hiatus is fairly frequent when the first open vowel is long.

v. 11 ἀνόρουσε¹:—for omission of temporal augment cf. S. ε3. 6 ἀμειβομαν, v. 26 below ἵκανε.

v. 12 κατά:—cf. η2 App. C 2 καταστείβοσι (perhaps not Sapphic) and v. 7 n. φίλοις:—apparently a short dative. We must remember (1) that φίλοις might possibly be accusative, cf. Soph. *Phil.* 141-2 σὲ δ', ω τέκνον, τόδ' ἐλήλυθεν πᾶν κράτος ὡγύγιον (cf. Lobel *Σμ.* p. xxxviii); (2) that since the preceding line ends in φίλος, φίλας here may be corrupt (θωός Sitzler, loc. cit.); (3) that κορύφαισιν ἄγνα (Alk. fr. 73b 2) is difficult to emend (but v. Bowra, *Mnemosyne* 34, ἄγνα for ἄγνας or ἄνγνα). But since another short dative seems to occur in v. 21 below (θέοις), it is perhaps best to admit that the form is due to epic influence. As for the possibility of the short dative in Lesbian, it is worth noticing that the evidence against it is 'not to be regarded as absolutely conclusive' (Lobel *Σμ.* p. xl).²

πτόλιν:—the epic form comes straight from Homer, and is obviously permissible in a poem dealing with epic characters; Alk.'s epic αὐτάρ (fr. 99. 7) has no such excuse.

v. 14 ὥχλος:—v. 8 supra n.

v. 15 παρθενίκαν:—cf. Alk. fr. 29. 5 παρθένικα.

v. 16 Περάμοιο:—Alk. fr. 130 ἐρχομένοιο. Alk. fr. 26. 2 has Περράμω. The epic licence seems particularly easy in a proper name.

v. 21 θέοις:—v. 12 supra n.

v. 23 ες 'Ιλιον:—cf. v. 26 infra ειθέρα. Elsewhere the vernacular always uses εις before a vowel. But v. n. on v. 7 supra.

v. 26 ἵκανε s.v. 1:—for omission of augment v. 11 supra n.

v. 28 ἵσ:—'Aeolica sunt ἵον (S. δ5. 7), ἵσθα (Alk. fr. 49. 1), ἵσ (Alk. fr. 45. 1, 54. 9 and 12, 63. 10 [Theocritus XXX. 16]),' Lobel on Alk. fr. 168.

v. 31 ἐλέλυσδον:—for omission of augment v. 11 supra n. ὄσαι:—cf. μέσοι Alk. fr. 117, ὑπάσω Alk. fr. 61. 25: Aeolic would be ὄσαι.

v. 33 ὄνκαλέοντες:—cf. Alk. fr. 85 ποτέονται. Combination of Aeolic ὄν- with non-Aeolic—καλέοντες, v. n. on line 11.

v. 34 ὑμνην:—3rd pers. plur. impf. of ὑμνημι; about which one 'erst nach einigem Kopfschütteln sich klar macht' (Wilamowitz, loc. cit.). But there is no objection to the form.

Thus it appears that there is only one abnormality which does not admit of immediate parallel or explanation:—the forms πορφύρα and ἀργύρα in vv. 9, 10. And these have led to a special theory of the origin of the poem.

¹ The spelling is curious here and elsewhere. In v. 33 π has ὄνκαλέοντες: we should have expected ἀν- in both places (because one abnormality would naturally introduce another). ὄνκαλέοντες and ἀνόρουσε are an odd mixture. Cf. the

varieties -μείχνυτο, -μίγνυτο within a few lines of each other.

² Whatever explanation is accepted, let it not be Jurenka's: Sappho wrote φίλοις dative 'weil das lesbische nicht in den Vers ging'!

In S

' where
gives [β]where π
not only
understa
was an
πορφύρι
New ChI h
' did no
loc. cit.
such th
presupp
from a
dative s
that theOne w
certain
contrac
we useBy
of πορ
tended
ostens
SapphI
consid¹ The
πορφύρ
thought
I cann
classical
once in² It
of an
ently b
cating
written
cf. the
ἀναλό
is—at
lation)
ably n
(see E
sq.).
good d

In S. ε2 App. 2 Lobel prints:—

πορφύραι κατά ἀντμενα

'where πορφύραι is the dative singular of the noun πορφύρα. In our poem he gives [β2. 9]':—

πορφύρ[α] κατά ἀντ[με]να

where πορφύρα is the neuter plural of an adjective. It follows that this passage is not only a reminiscence of the first, but the reminiscence of a writer who did not fully understand Aeolic. Who, then, was this writer? One point emerges: he (or she) was an Athenian. πορφύρα and ἀργύρα are the Attic counterparts of the Aeolic πορφύρα and ἀργύρα, and their presence here indicates their place of origin' (Bowra, *New Chapters in Greek Literature III*, p. 12, after Lobel, *Σμ*, p. lxv).

I hope I may be permitted to cherish a faint scepticism about the writer who 'did not fully understand Aeolic,' and about the 'pure misunderstanding' (Lobel, loc. cit.) on which the erroneous imitation of Sappho ε2 App. 2 rests. No doubt, such things are possible; but I am not convinced that our problem is to be solved by presupposing a writer so careless as to permit himself the bold imitation of a line from another poem without stopping to think whether a certain word was a noun, dative singular, or an adjective, accusative plural. Further, it is important to observe that the reading of ε2 App. 2 is very doubtful. The MS. gives:—

Χερρόμακτρα δὲ καγγόνων
πορφύρα κατανταμενάτατι-
-ματεις ἔπειμ' ἀπὸ Φωκάας
δῶρα τίμια καγγόνων.

One would have thought that the second line of this is desperately corrupted, beyond certain emendation. Lobel's version, in which the short -ά at the end of the glyconic contradicts Sappho's usage, is by no means certain, and we ought to hesitate before we use it as a basis for a far-reaching conclusion about β2.¹

But the real problem still lies before us. We may not believe this explanation of πορφύρα and ἀργύρα; but can we suggest anything better? Nothing so far has tended to show that πορφύρα and ἀργύρα are anything but Attic forms standing in an ostensibly Sapphic poem. Are they in themselves a sufficient reason for denying Sappho's authorship?

I submit that they are not; for I see no reason why the forms should not be considered Ionic.²

¹ The reading in β2 is not really uncertain: πορφύρ[α] κατά δύτ[με]να it must have been, though I do not pretend to know what it means. I cannot find the word δύτμην elsewhere in classical Greek, except once in the *Iliad* and once in the *Odyssey*.

² It is by no means obvious that the presence of an Attic form in an Abnormal Poem apparently by Sappho is sufficient reason for adjudicating the poem from her. For (1) poetry was written in Attica long before Sappho's lifetime, cf. the famous hexameter δέ νῦν ὄρχηστῶν πάντων ἀταλύταρα παιζει (the continuation τοῦτο δεκάν μν̄ is—at least for the last six letters—mere speculation); the inscription is incised, but is probably not later than the end of the eighth century (see Furtwaengler, *Mitth. d. Ath. Inst.* VI 106 sq.). One may be pardoned for thinking that a good deal of poetry was composed before house-

holders, however gracefully they danced, began to scratch hexameters on undistinguished vases to prove their ownership.

(2) If it be said that the dialect of this inscription is not necessarily Attic, it must at least be confessed that Solon, who went to Asia Minor in his youth, admitted some Attic forms in his poetry (e.g. παρούσας, 3. 9 Diehl, μονάρχου 10. 9 Diehl). It is not at all improbable that his songs were sung in Lesbos during Sappho's lifetime. Of the contact of Lesbos with Attica in the Sigean War and of the Stela of Phanodikos I say nothing.

(3) Does Ἀτθίς = 'the girl from Attica'? If so, here is a ready explanation of Sappho's familiarity (if she was familiar) with Attic forms in poetry.—She learnt them from Atthis. Γογγύλα is 'Dumpling'; Μίκα is 'Tiny'; Γυρίνω is 'Tadpole'; Gorgo, of whom we only know that

The scansion of -*ɛ̄* as -*ɛ̄* occurs in Homer, whose influence on this poem cannot be denied. Two observations must be made by the way. First, I must make the very reasonable assumption that *πορφύρα*, *ἀργύρα*, are 'corrected' spellings of *πορφύρεα*, *ἀργύρεα*, not of *πορφύρια*, *ἀργύρια*. The Papyrus (P. Oxy. 1232) unquestionably had *πορφύρα*¹ as well as *ἀργύρα*; but then the Papyrus has ὄνειρύντο beside ὄνειρέχνυτο, ἀνόρουστο beside ὄνκαλεόντες. There have certainly been some spelling 'corrections,' and my assumption is simply that this scribe or another converted an earlier *πορφύρεα* into *πορφύρα*: i.e. that the writer meant originally an Ionic form, not an Attic or an Aeolic. Secondly, the possibility of synizesis in the Lesbian vernacular must no longer be allowed to obscure the discussion. Synizesis of -*ɛ̄* is proved by Alk. fr. 17. 11 *ἀργαλέτη*; contrast *ἀργαλέαν* fr. 105. 2: of -*ɛ̄os* by fr. 119. 5 *βελέτος*; contrast *ξιφέδης* fr. 112. 2. Homer had admitted synizesis even of -*ɛ̄as* and -*ɛ̄os* (B 811, *πολίτος*; Φ 567, *πολίτης*—before a vowel); cf. *Αιγυπτῖη* δ 229, *σχετλῖη* Γ 414, *Ιστιαία* B 537. But we are not looking for a parallel to synizesis. We are faced with the scansion of -*ɛ̄e* as one long syllable -*ɛ̄a*: more exactly, with a neuter plural nominative of a second declension adjective making -*ɛ̄e* scanned as -*ɛ̄a* in arsis before the consonants *κ* and *τ*. Part of this exacter definition is important. Just as synizesis is not a true parallel to scansion of -*ɛ̄a* as -*ɛ̄a*, so this scansion in thesis is not a true parallel to this scansion in arsis. In this respect Anacreon 11. 3 Diehl *στηθέα* is not parallel, but 8. 2 *ετέα* is; 21. 2 *μεληδέα* is not, but 39. 1 *νεοθηλέα* is. It may be important to remember that such scensions were made by a poet who lived so soon after Sappho; but the parallel must not be drawn too closely, partly because of the difference in dates, still more because it is Homer by whom Sappho is influenced in this poem, and in whom we ought most naturally to seek the origin of her divagations from vernacular. And indeed the influence of Homer seems particularly noticeable in β2. 9. Was it not Andromache herself who was weaving a web

δίπλακα πορφυρέην, ἐν δὲ θρόνα ποικίλ' ἐπαυσσεν²?

Sappho copied the words *πορφυρέην* and *ποικίλα*. Here above all the debt to Homer is openly confessed. Then why on earth should she have hesitated to follow Homer further and scan -*ɛ̄a* as -*ɛ̄a*? There is sufficient evidence for the scansion in Homer (see esp. La Roche, *Homericische Untersuchungen*, pp. 146 sqq.):

ἰψερέφεα (acc. plur.) δ 757; *ἀινοπαθέα* (acc. sing.) σ 201; *πρωτοπαγέα* (acc. sing.) Ω 267: cf. *τεμενέα* λ 185; *σακέα* Δ 113; *στηθέα* Δ 282; *βελέα* Ο 444.

In all these examples the 'contracted' syllable is in arsis. All, admittedly, are examples from adjectives in -*ɛ̄s* and nouns of the third declension in -*ɛ̄os*; but Sappho may well have thought that -*ɛ̄e* scanned as -*ɛ̄a* is much the same whatever the word in which it occurs.

In future those who deny that Sappho wrote this poem will have to maintain as their principal argument 'that Sappho, though familiar with Homer's *ἰψερέφεα* and *τεμενέα*, could not have written *πορφυρέα* in a poem in which she acknowledges his influence in other respects.'³

someone 'had had quite enough of' her, is, naturally, 'The Gorgon,' and appropriately belonged (I suppose) to Andromeda's rival establishment. So did Gello, 'Baby-Snatcher' (Hesych. s.v. *δαιμων* ήν οι γυναῖκες τὰ νεογνά παιδά φασιν ἀρτάζειν).

We must at least allow that (a) some dactylic poetry admitted a very sparse admixture of Attic forms during Sappho's lifetime, (b) Sappho could easily have been acquainted with some of that poetry. These considerations, together with our

profound ignorance of the beginnings of Attic poetry, should give us pause. At the same time I have no reply if asked whether Attic forms in Ionic may justify Attic forms in Lesbian.

¹ The *η* is missing, but there is only room for one letter, and that letter must have been *ɛ̄*, not *η*, because a 'long' stroke is clearly visible above the gap.

² X 441.

³ This argument may not be as weak as it seems at first sight: we know too little about

It is an apology for
importance of
heroes in the
epic period
and his
is a gift
bringing
the location
second

CH

this side
frankly
acquiesces
in -os (31)
from -ɛ̄a

¹ I am
portant
acknowle

It should be obvious by this time that 'Homeric influence' is not a catch-word apology, but an entirely justifiable explanation. It is of the greatest interest and importance for our study of the transmission of epic themes to lyric poetry. The heroes of Homer bring their own dialect with them. Stesichorus, when he introduced epic persons and stories into his lyrics, introduced something of their dialect too; and his poetry was certainly known to Sappho. The linguistic argument against $\beta 2$ is a gigantic irrelevance. Which would be more surprising here, an epic theme bringing with it a few epic words and forms, or an epic theme composed wholly in the local vernacular? It seems to me that the first is obviously natural, and that the second would be far less natural, not to say almost grotesque.¹

DENYS PAGE.

CHRIST CHURCH, OXFORD.

this side of Greek *Stilgefühl*: I have to admit frankly that it is *possible* that Sappho might have acquiesced in -*ā* from adjectives in -*ης* and nouns in -*ος* (3rd decl.), and yet have recoiled in horror from -*ā* from a 2nd decl. adj. in -*eos*.

¹ I am indebted to Mr. Lobel for several important criticisms and suggestions: but my acknowledgment must not be taken to imply that

he agrees with my conclusions.

I am also grateful to Mr. Bowra, who, besides first suggesting that *τορφίρα* might be an Atticized version of an Ionic form, generously assisted my discussion of the view which he expressed in *New Chapters*. He has modified his own view in his forthcoming publication on 'Greek Lyric Poetry from Alcman to Simonides.'

em cannot
make the
of *τορφίρα*,
nably had
νερείχνυτο,
rections,'
er *τορφίρα*
Attic or an
r must no
d by Alk.
; contrast
II, *πολιός*;

τα B 537.
e scansion
ative of a
sonants
not a true
el to this
rallel, but
ortant to
Sappho;
ference in
his poem,
from ver-
in $\beta 2$. 9.

o Homer
w Homer
n Homer

.) Ω 267 :

edly, are
t Sappho
the word

maintain
τορφίρα and
edges his

s of Attic
same time
c forms in
an.

room for
een a, not
y visible

weak as it
tle about

A sin
be noted

ελαττον γ
χρόνι

πολὺς δ' ἐ^τ
οὐ ἀπῆ

γῆς desce
Universe,

στων ἐστί^τ
τὰ στ

The
intruded

Furt
which th

E an
it unnatu
hand the

wrote th
by an em

So r
clarity.

Aristotle
and all, i

(i) V
alone, JI

285^a
τ' ο

The
weigh ag

See
tr.), 289^a

Els
(ii)

frequent

ελά
δ, ἵ

ON THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE *DE CAELO* OF ARISTOTLE.

I.

THE text of the *de Caelo* was the subject of an interesting article in the *Rivista di Storia Antica*, N.S. IX, by Dr. R. Rubrichi; he showed that where the manuscripts diverge, we ought to bring in the evidence of Simplicius, and that when we look closely into the sense, the commentator's reading is in most cases decidedly preferable; he also established a fact which is familiar from editions of the other physical treatises, namely that there is some specially close affinity between the text of E and that used by Simplicius.

I propose here to leave Simplicius alone and to deal rather with the manuscripts. In one other respect my way of approach is complementary to that of the scholar I have mentioned; for whereas he has taken a number of cases in which a difference of sense is involved, I propose to take some in which the sense of the rival readings is approximately the same. These are, in a way, the more instructive. For I think we shall find that it is the same group of manuscripts which always comes under the suspicion of emending the text to introduce neatness of phrasing, clarity, logical or grammatical precision. And if there has been such emendation from non-utilitarian motives, we shall naturally be on our guard against those manuscripts which have it in other cases as well. The inquiry may be of some intrinsic interest, and may also serve as an apologia for a new text which will shortly be published.

We can confine ourselves to the six manuscripts EFHJLM, descriptions of which will be found in Mr. F. H. Fobes's edition of the *Meteorologica*. They fall very distinctly into two groups—EL on the one hand, JFHM on the other. (H has, however, here as in the *Meteorologica*, a certain independence. It is an older and better manuscript than FHM.) Instances of the former group are apparently much rarer; but there is an important addition to it in the Graeco-Latin version which was probably made in the thirteenth century by William of Moerbeke. This, if the manuscripts which I have seen are reliable, is in close agreement with E, swerving rarely to the other side.

If L was directly copied from E, it must, I think, have been at a time when many of the original readings of the latter had already been obliterated by rash correctors. We can still in some cases use L to reveal an erased word of E¹. But much more often L is a fickle companion, which deserts its leader at the time of crisis.

II.

There are many divergences between EL and JFHM which are unique in kind, and from these no inference can be drawn. I shall here concentrate on those which fall under some general category, and are characteristic of the two groups.

(a) *An explanatory noun, present in JFHM, is absent from EL.*

271^b 27 ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἀνάγκη τὸ σῶμα τὸ κύκλῳ φερόμενον πεπεράνθαι πᾶν, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. εἰ γὰρ ἄπειρον τὸ κύκλῳ φερόμενον [σῶμα], ἄπειροι. . . .

σῶμα om. EL. Even if the word had not occurred in the last clause, it would not, by Aristotle's usage, be necessary.

ON THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE *DE CAELO* OF ARISTOTLE 17

273^a 13. ὡρισμένου οὖν τοῦ μέσου [τόπου] καὶ τὸν ἄνω τόπον ἀνάγκη ὡρίσθαι.

A similar instance. EL, with Sp and the Latin version, omit *τόπον*. It is to be noted that no manuscript omits *τόπον*.

275^a 10. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ἄπειρον ὑπ' οὐδενὸς πεπερασμένου κινήσεται ἐν οὐδενὶ χρόνῳ· ἐλάττον γὰρ ἀλλο ἐν τῷ ὕψῳ [χρόνῳ] ὑπὸ ἐλάττονος κινηθήσεται. . . .

χρόνῳ om. EL.

294^b 25. διὰ γὰρ τὴν στενοχωρίαν οὐκ ἔχων τὴν πάροδον δὲ ἀλλο μένει διὰ τὸ πλῆθος· πολὺς δ' ἔστιν [ό ἀλλο] διὰ τὸ ὑπὸ μεγέθους πολλοῦ ἐναπολαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ τῆς γῆς.

ο ἀλλο om. EL.

296^b 14. (In this context it has been agreed that τὰ βάρος ἔχοντα καὶ τὰ μόρια τῆς γῆς descend towards the centre of the Earth. But if this is also the centre of the Universe, we have still to ask in which capacity it attracts the weights.) ἀνάγκη δὴ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ παντός· καὶ γὰρ τὰ κοῦφα καὶ τὸ πῦρ, εἰς τούναντίον φερόμενα τοῖς βάρεσι [τῆς γῆς], πρὸς τὸ ἔσχατον φέρεται (ἔσχατον = the circumference of the Universe).

τῆς γῆς om. EL, with Simplicius. The words *may* owe their insertion to a mistake, but are more probably meant to clear up the argument. They give an inaccurate summary of the full phrase τὰ βάρος ἔχοντα καὶ τὰ μόρια τῆς γῆς.

298^a 32. . . . πάθη δὲ καὶ ἔργα τὰς τε κινήσεις τὰς τούτων ἐκάστου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσων ἔστιν αἵτια ταῦτα [τὰ στοιχεῖα] κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν ἑαυτῶν.

τὰ στοιχεῖα om. EHL.

The explanatory noun is useful at the first time of reading, but has obviously intruded from the margin.

Further instances occur at 272^a 14, 280^a 30, 290^a 4, and I conclude with one in which the inferior manuscripts alone show the addition.

298^a 17. τὸ μέγεθος . . . εἰς τετταράκοντα λέγοντος εἶναι μηριάδας [σταδίων].

E and J both omit the noun; so also does Simplicius, who does not seem to find it unnatural. ('ἐπειδὴ μὴ προστέθεικε σταδίων εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ μέτρον.') On the other hand the Latin version seems to have it. It is more likely than not that Aristotle wrote the word, but it can only have been reinstated in our inferior manuscripts by an emendation.

So much for instances of the first class. The additions serve the purpose of clarity. It is of course risky to side invariably with EL. I think it was probably Aristotle's habit to abbreviate; but he might choose to write the full phrase, noun and all, if he scented any ambiguity.

(b) *Addition of τε, and of the definite article.*

(i) Where there are pairs of verbs, these are often joined together in EL by *καὶ* alone, JFHM adding the word *τε*. This is particularly common in the second book.

285^b 19. εἰ οὖν ἄρχεται [τ'] ἀπὸ τῶν δεξιῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ δεξιὰ περιφέρεται. . . .

τ' om. EJH.

The omission of *τ'* makes a hiatus; but it is not a harsh one, and this must not weigh against the evidence of the three best manuscripts.

See also 285^b 26 (*τε* om. E), 286^b 11 (*τε* om. E), 287^a 29 (*τε* om. EL and Lat. tr.), 289^a 24 (*τε* om. EJLM), 295^a 4 (*γὰρ* EL: *τε γὰρ δὴ* JHM).

Elsewhere the addition consists of the word *γε* (294^b 30, 296^a 4).

(ii) The insertion of the article—if I may so call it without prejudice—is also frequent. At 291^b 35 we have

ἐλάττον γὰρ [ό] ἥλιος καὶ [ή] σελήνη κινοῦνται κινήσεις. . . .

ό, ή om. EL.

Again at 297^b 7, the article is a manifest addition, for it is put in the wrong gender: *βώλος* is always feminine in the *de Caelo* and elsewhere in Aristotle. *ἐπὶ βώλον* EHL: *ἐπὶ τοῦ βώλον* JFM.

Further, in the *de Caelo* Aristotle constantly has occasion to use such phrases as *τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω, τὸ κοῦφον καὶ βαρύν*. A few manuscripts generally add a second *τὸ*, although E never does so. There may be a slight difference in the sense; *τὸ κοῦφον καὶ βαρύν* would stress the fact that these terms are a pair, and that what is said of *κοῦφον* applies also to *βαρύν*.

Thus, at 281^b 3

ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἀδύνατον καὶ [τὸ] δυνατὸν καὶ [τὸ] ψεῦδος καὶ [τὸ] ἀληθὲς τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἵποθέσεως . . .

The words in brackets are omitted by E¹J. Possibly we should read *τὸ* the second time, before *ψεῦδος*; more likely the force of the first *τὸ* continues, as with the figure outside a bracket in algebra.

In similar circumstances, some manuscripts repeat a preposition.

302^a 21. ἐν μὲν γὰρ σαρκὶ καὶ ἔνδυλῳ καὶ [έν] ἐκάστῳ τῶν τοιούτων. . . .
ἐν om. EFLS^c.

(iii) Certain other additions need no comment. EL sometimes omit *ἔστιν* (296^a 34), sometimes the first *η̄* in such a phrase as *η̄ ἐνεργείᾳ η̄ δυνάμει, η̄ ἀπλοῖν η̄ μικτόν*.

(c) *Emendation on grounds of grammar and style.*

This is the crucial point in the whole business, for a change of this kind cannot be due to mere chance, nor is it likely to arise by accretions in the margin of manuscripts. The owner of a copy might sometimes add a supplementary noun for his own enlightenment; but he would not alter the grammar unless he imagined himself to be restoring what Aristotle wrote.

299^b 3. πολλὰ γάρ ἔστιν ἀ μικρὰ ὄντα ἀπλῶς ὅμως μείζω ἐτέρων ἔστιν.

EL and Lat. trans.

. . . μικρὰ ὄντα ἀπλῶς μείζω τινῶν ἐτέρων ἔστιν. JFHM.

First with regard to the adverbs. It *might* be that *ἀπλῶς* and *ὅμως* are alternative readings which have both survived in EL. But is it not more probable that some editor, objecting to the assonance, has insisted on omitting *ὅμως*?

Again *τινῶν* *might* have been omitted by EL because there was doubt whether it came before or after *ἐτέρων*. Is it not more likely to have been inserted to restore the balance of the sentence after *ὅμως* had been omitted?

299^b 7. ἔτι εἰ τὸ μὲν βαρὺ πυκνόν τι, τὸ δὲ κοῦφον μανόν, ἔστι δὲ πυκνὸν μανοῦ διαφέρον τῷ εἰ ἵστρος ὅγκῳ πλείον ἐντάρχειν,—εἰ οὖν ἔστι στιγμὴ βαρεῖα καὶ κούφη, ἔστι καὶ πυκνὴ καὶ μανή. ‘If weight is a sort of density and lightness of rarity: and if the dense differs from the rare in that more matter is contained in an equal volume: if then the point can be heavy or light, it can also be dense or rare.’

J, which is followed in part by other manuscripts, rewrites the sentence in two places . . . τὸ δὲ κοῦφον μανόν τι ἔστι, τὸ δὲ πυκνὸν μανοῦ διαφέρει τῷ . . . εἰ οὖν ἔστι στιγμὴ βαρεῖα, καὶ κούφη ἔστι, καὶ εἰ πυκνή, καὶ μανή.

Now, while it cannot be said that the version of E is actually bad grammar, it contains the somewhat unusual *ἔστι διαφέρον* for *διαφέρει*, and later on an unliterary coupling of adjectives: ‘if there is a point heavy-and-light, there is also one dense-and-rare.’ The version of J is more correct—and yet somehow duller. It involves

ON TH

the in se
certain t

Ne
correct s

271
τὰ μέγιστα

JF
κινήσει,

And
εἰρημένοι

ποι
Ag
this sub

287
τῶν κινήσεων

EL
an edito

310
improve
tion. F

For

τὸ π
αντί

The
I w

300
ἀπακτώ
σώματα.

E c
reprove
was in
so, for t
bodies a

The
the part
alternati
As it is,
from wh
or ‘actu

Fu
whether
indirect
understa

(d)

I ha
was Ari
order of

303

ON THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE *DE CAELO* OF ARISTOTLE 19

the insertion of three words, and the alteration of a fourth. It seems practically certain that it is not the original text.

Next, there are some instances in which an editor seems to have demanded the correct sequence in a conditional clause.

271^b 9. οὗν εἴ τις ἐλάχιστον εἶναι τι φάγη μέγεθος. οὗτος γὰρ τοὐλάχιστον εἰσαγαγὼν τὰ μέγιστα κινεῖ τῶν μαθηματικῶν.

JFM, with the Latin version, give τὰ μέγιστα ἀν κινήσει, whilst H has μέγιστα κινήσει, a compromise. The present tense is livelier.

And 304^a 22. εἴ μὲν γὰρ ἄτομον τὸ πρῶτον σῶμα ποιοῦντι, πάλιν ἡξουσιν οἱ πρότερον εἰρημένοι λόγοι πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν.

ποιοῦντι EFLS^c: ποιήσοντι JHM.

Again, the attempt to evade or mitigate repetitions is an important part of this subject. We will take as instances

287^a 23. ἔτι δ' εἰ . . . ἐλαχίστη κίνησις ἡ ταχίστη, [δῆλον ὅτι] ταχίστη ἀν εἴη πασῶν τῶν κινήσεων ἡ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ κίνησις.

EL, with Lat. tr., omit δῆλον ὅτι. It seems best to assume that they are due to an editor, who was offended by the repetition.

310^b 12. οὐλοὶ ὕδωρ ἀέρι καὶ ἀὴρ πυρί. JFHM have οὗτος in place of ἀήρ. No improvement in style is effected, but nevertheless that seems to have been the intention. For similar instances see 308^a 3, 4 and 311^b 25.

Formal correctness is again responsible, it seems, for an alteration at 277^b 5:

τὸ πλειόν πῦρ θάττον φέρεται καὶ ἡ πλειόν γῆ εἰς τὸν αἰτήσ τόπον.
αἰτήσ E: αἴτην JM, αὐτῶν FHL.

The plural would include both πῦρ and γῆ.

I will end with a curious instance:

300^b 26. ἔτι δὲ τοσοῦτον ἐπανέροιτ' ἀν τις, πότερον [δυνατὸν ἡ] οὐχ οἶόν τ' ἡν κινούμενα ἀτακτῶς καὶ μίγνυσθαι τοιαίτας μέζεις ἔνια, ἐξ ὃν συνισταται τὰ κατὰ φύσιν συνιστάμενα σῶματα.

E omits δυνατὸν ἡ, and so also did Simplicius. In the context Plato is being reprobated. He supposed that before the act of divine creation the world of matter was in utterly irregular motion. Aristotle asks 'whether it was not possible, even so, for the elements by chance to form those mixtures (like flesh and bone) of which bodies are compounded under the reign of Nature.'

The omission of δυνατὸν ἡ is not, as a hasty glance would indicate, an error on the part of E and S. Two facts prove this. (i) If πότερον was to be followed by alternative questions, Aristotle would surely have said πότερον δυνατὸν ἡ ἀδύνατον ἡν. As it is, δυνατόν and οἶόν τ' are a pair of pointless synonyms which distract attention from what is being said. (ii) The καὶ before μίγνυσθαι—to be translated 'even so' or 'actually'—has no force whatever if δυνατὸν ἡ are included.

Further, it is a slightly incredulous question that we want: 'one might ask whether it was not possible. . . ?' So that I think πότερον is here the equivalent in indirect speech of μῶν; and I would ascribe δυνατὸν ἡ to an editor who did not understand this.

(d) *Order of words.*

I have neglected the question of hiatus, since I have not been convinced that it was Aristotle's practice to avoid it. But I think I can give instances where the order of words has been changed on some ascertainable principle.

303^a 26. ἀέρα καὶ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ EHL: ἀέρα καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν JF.

The latter gives the elements their correct stations in Aristotle's cosmos.

300^a 3. εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτον διαφέρει τὸν τρόπον, ἀλλὰ τῷ τὴν μὲν γῆν εἶναι βαρύ, τῷ δὲ πῦρ κοῦφον, ἔσται καὶ τῶν ἐπιπέδων τῷ μὲν κοῦφον τῷ δὲ βαρύ. EHLH:

τῷ μὲν βαρὺ τῷ δὲ κοῦφον JF.

The former reading gives a chiasmus (earth, fire, light, heavy), but the latter aims at immediate clarity.

Moreover, it can be said with some reservations that the text of JF tries to observe two principles about order: the verb comes after the noun, both in direct and indirect speech; and a qualifying genitive always, where possible, precedes its noun or verb.

Thus at 270^a 13 we have

ἀνάγκη τινὸς εἶναι ἄλλον τοῦτον τὸν τόπον EL: τινὸς ἄλλον εἶναι JFHM

and at 274^b 10

ἀπάντων εἶναι JFM: εἶναι πάντων HL (E has simply πάντων).

Some further instances:

304^a 20. φασι γίγνεσθαι EL: γίγνεσθαι φασι JFHM.

304^b 5. μέρος τοῦ πυρός EL: τοῦ πυρὸς μέρος JFHM.

304^b 32. πρότερος τούτου EL: τούτου πρότερος JFHM.

309^a 6. κονφίζειν τὰ σώματα ELM: τὰ σώματα κονφίζειν JFH.

Again, in references to geometrical figures, EL often choose the order natural to the diagram (for example $\eta\epsilon$), whereas JFHM convert this into the alphabetical order. And in 311^a 21 and 31 the position of the words $\delta\epsilon$ and $\gamma\alpha\rho$ seems to have been a stumbling block to JFHM. The other manuscripts make each of them the fourth word in its sentence.

III.

Two criticisms have probably occurred to anyone who has read so far. The first is that a number of contrary instances can be found. The second is that I have begged the question from the start by speaking of 'additions,' and so forth. Is it more typical of an editor to add words than to erase them?

These criticisms are in a measure justified, and yet I do not think we can deny that we have in E a nearer approach to what Aristotle wrote.

There are, indeed, many contrary instances, particularly as regards the position of words. But if we remember that Aristotle himself is not likely to have observed any rigid principle, invariably writing $\sigmaώμα γίγνεσθαι$, etc., this is perhaps natural. Besides, no manuscript, even E, is free from emendation.

The second criticism is also partly valid; but I have never meant to contend that an editor should pin his faith entirely to EL. (i) E, as is known, is peculiarly liable to omissions from homoioteleuton, and an editor must beware that he is not trapped by this when he thinks he is attaining true Aristotelian brevity. (ii) The omission of $\tau\epsilon$ in a number of cases does suggest the laziness of a scribe. (iii) The homely plainness of the text of E is not always a virtue. For instance, at 296^b 8-11, the sentence runs so smoothly in the text of J that one's suspicions are aroused. But the text of E is so superlatively uncouth that I think it would be madness to follow it; it has probably arisen by a mere accident.

The golden rule, then, is to follow E, but to be continually on the alert against mere errors; a line must be drawn between homeliness and absurdity.

Now a courageous acceptance of this rule would take us much further in loyalty to E than Bekker and Prantl were prepared to go. But we ought not to lose courage, the more so as some initial hypothesis about Aristotle's style of writing is in

ON TH

any case
possible
out by t
you are
ceased t

Ind
plicius,
survivin
probabl
line and
others in
truer on
frame of
hypothe
they can
Lest I
the brev

BALLIO

ON THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE *DE CAELO* OF ARISTOTLE 21

any case necessary. To take the instance of the explanatory nouns: it would be a *possible* view that Aristotle's own manuscript had them, and that they were struck out by the editor from whose text EL are descended. But if you accept this account you are still making a hypothesis about Aristotle's style, for which there has long ceased to be any conclusive evidence.

Indeed an unproved hypothesis of this kind may have been as necessary to Simplicius, and before him to Andronicus of Rhodes, as to ourselves. How, in the surviving manuscripts, are the rival readings likely to have originated? The most probable view is that there was at some time an archetype with additions above the line and in the margin; and that some scribes were more apt to neglect them, whilst others inserted them in the text. This itself suggests that the shorter text is the truer one; for we have to ask who is likely to have made such additions, and in what frame of mind. If they were meant as emendations, their author was working on a hypothesis which we in the twentieth century are still free to reject or accept. If they came from an older manuscript, this may in turn have incorporated emendations. Lest I have overemphasized my point, let me conclude by saying that I consider that the brevity of E is itself, in many cases, the product of misguided correctors.

D. J. ALLAN.

BALLIOL COLLEGE.

PLOTINUS AND INDIA.

ONE of the most interesting recent attempts to interpret the peculiarities of Plotinus's philosophy is that of Bréhier in his 'La Philosophie de Plotin' (*Bibl. de la Revue des Cours et Conférences*, Boivin, Paris, 1928). His thesis, contained in the last four chapters of the work, is that Plotinus, instead of being simply the continuator of the Greek rationalist tradition, is the founder of modern European Idealism, or, perhaps more accurately, Pantheism. 'Avec Plotin nous saisissons donc le premier chainon d'une tradition religieuse qui n'est pas moins puissante au fond en Occident que la tradition chrétienne . . .' He is the spiritual ancestor of Spinoza and Hegel. It is interesting in passing to compare this view with that of Dean Inge, for whom Plotinus is the spiritual begetter of S. Thomas Aquinas. The divergences of modern interpreters of the Plotinian metaphysic are often both amusing and suggestive.

To define M. Bréhier's position more closely; he holds that Plotinus' radical innovation was a complete abandonment of the traditional Platonic and Aristotelian view of an objectively existing intelligible world knowable by discursive reason (a view which was in fact also tacitly accepted by Stoicism) for a philosophy in which the distinction between subject and object becomes meaningless. The essential feature of this philosophy is the denial of the reality of all limitation of the self, of all individual personality. The self and the One and Infinite Reality are one and the same. Hence there is no place for discursive reason, for division and classification in the intelligible world, for an arduous ascent of the soul to the truth by a long process of reasoning. All that is necessary is that the soul should turn in upon itself and recognize that it is the One Being. This idea obviously excludes not only the normal Greek rationalism but the popular Oriental religions of Plotinus's time, with their saviours and mediators between man and a transcendent God. The origin of this revolutionary innovation M. Bréhier finds in the Indian philosophy of the Upanishads. Thus he finds an Oriental origin for the distinctive aspects of Plotinus's philosophy without laying himself open to the attacks which have been directed against attempts to connect it with the contemporary religions of the Near East.

Neither the view of the essential characteristics of Plotinus's philosophy stated above nor the suggestion of its Indian affinities are completely new, but M. Bréhier states his case with such admirable clearness and conciseness that his book provides a good basis for a discussion of the problem from the opposite point of view—that which finds it unnecessary to go outside the tradition of Greek thought in order to explain Plotinus.

It must first be admitted that M. Bréhier's theory involves in itself no absolute impossibility and does not require a distortion of the teaching of Plotinus. The idea of the one infinite principle of reality, which is identical with the deepest and truest self of the individual, runs through the whole of the *Enneads*. It is especially clear in the strongly religious VI. 9, in VI. 4 and 5, in V. 5, to give only a few examples; and it is implied, if not clearly stated, in the argument on free-will in VI. 8 (in Ch. 14 of this treatise the One is called *πρώτως αὐτὸς καὶ ἵπερόντως αὐτός*). The outspoken acceptance of infinity in the intelligible world at the end of V. 7, in defiance of all Greek tradition since Pythagoras, points in the same direction. It may be objected that there is also another side to Plotinus's philosophy in which he approaches much more closely to the objective and rationalist tradition of his Greek predecessors, and makes use of discursive reasoning. In fact there is a great deal of quite close reasoning in the *Enneads*, and Plotinus certainly does not disdain to use it to demonstrate

his most
phers of
is that t
the very

It c
is impos
was a g
Trade-R
Empire
novel A
Indian.
striking
the mys
ence is,
of philo
his exp
itself.
whatev
plausib

The
can be
which
Greek
evidenc
compan
was th
interest
back to
and all

Br
real in
iciency.
added
own id
in the
said by
origina
India.
This,
Plotin
nation
fall of
Porphy
profes
Sakka
profes
this is
exten
conte

1 W
and lit
Plotin
trade

his most cherished principles. But this is an inconsistency common to all philosophers of his type, and perhaps inevitable. All that is necessary to Bréhier's theory is that the non-rationalist, as he thinks non-Greek, element in Plotinus should play the very large part in the *Enneads* that it demonstrably does.

It cannot be said, either, that the Indian origin of this type of thought in Plotinus is impossible; though definite evidence is not forthcoming, or likely to be. There was a great deal of intercourse between Alexandria and India (cp. Charlesworth, *Trade-Routes of the Roman Empire* ch. 4, and Warmington, *Commerce between the Roman Empire and India*, especially 'Conclusion' ¹), and Strabo XV and Philostratus' pious novel *Apollonius of Tyana* give an idea of the interest taken by the Greeks in things Indian. And the parallels given between Plotinus and the Upanishads are certainly striking. Nor can they really be adequately explained by saying that the mind of the mystic works much the same everywhere and at all times. The mystical experience is, so to speak, metaphysically colourless. It can be the basis of a vast variety of philosophical systems, often contradictory and incompatible. The explanation of his experience given by each mystic will depend on other factors than the experience itself. It is necessary, therefore, either to accept the theory of an influence, through whatever intermediaries, of the Upanishads upon Plotinus or else to find a more plausible origin for this peculiarity of his system nearer home.

This, I think, is as strongly favourable a statement of M. Bréhier's position as can be made. Now to deal with the other side. The evidence from other writers which he quotes on pp. 132-33 for the impression made by Indian philosophy on Greek thinkers is admittedly slight and unimportant compared with the internal evidence of the *Enneads* themselves. But an examination of these passages and a comparison with Strabo XV suggest one interesting question. This is, what really was the attitude of the Greeks towards foreign thought? Certainly, they professed interest in the wisdom of the East, and liked to trace the pedigrees of their philosophies back to Egypt. Plato decorates the *Phaedrus* with a pretty myth about the god Thoth, and alleges an Egyptian origin for his story of Atlantis.

But surely there was never a people which in its thinking was less open to any real influence from abroad. The Greek had a high idea of his intellectual self-sufficiency. But to father his own ideas on an ancient Oriental civilization gave them an added dignity and a flavour of romance. Hence what he really liked was to find his own ideas mirrored in the words of the philosophers of the East.² This is borne out in the passages mentioned above. There is nothing in them that could not have been said by a Greek philosopher, nothing to show that the Greeks appreciated the real originality and profundity of Indian thought. They saw Pythagoras everywhere in India (cp. Strabo XV. C. 716), just as they made Moses a Stoic (Strabo XVI. C. 761). This, I think, is as true of the professional Hellenes, the Greek intellectual élite, of Plotinus's day as of the city-state Greek of Plato's; even later, the tradition of nationalist *avtárakeia* and spiritual pride was continued by Byzantium, and, after the fall of Constantinople, by the Orthodox Church. And one thing that is clear from Porphyry's 'Life' is that Plotinus, in spite of his dissatisfaction with the Alexandrian professors of his youth and his selection of the self-taught or *θεοδιδάκτος* Ammonius Sakkas as a teacher, was by the time when he wrote the *Enneads* a professor of professors, a student living in a world of books, immersed in the Hellenic past. And this is also the atmosphere of the *Enneads*. There is practically nothing in the whole extent of Plotinus's writings which can be construed as even the remotest allusion to contemporary affairs.

¹ Warmington holds, however, on numismatic and literary evidence that during the period of Plotinus's early life and education direct sea-trade between the Empire and India had almost

ceased to exist; op. cit. I, ch. III, pp. 136-37.

² The possible real and deeper Oriental influence on Stoicism is in its temper, not its intellectual content.

I do not think that too much can be built on his alleged allusions to the mysteries of Isis or his praise of hieroglyphics in V. 8. 6 (however significant this last may be as an illustration of his attitude towards discursive reason and however interesting to the modern philosopher) as evidences of any real Oriental influence. They seem to me simply examples of that decorating of Greek ideas with Oriental ornaments which I have already mentioned. His expedition with the Emperor Gordian to study the philosophies of Persia and India is perhaps more significant. But he never reached India, and for the reasons given above I feel doubtful whether, if he had, he would have done more than discover Pythagoreanism among the Brahmins.

The external evidence, then, seems to prove nothing. It remains then to deal with the evidence of the *Enneads* themselves. I think, as I have said above, that Bréhier's description of Plotinus' peculiar sort of pantheism or subjective idealism is substantially correct. But I also think that this type of thought is by no means uncommon in unimpeachably Greek quarters, and perhaps goes back a good deal further than the objective rationalism which Bréhier (and most other people) regards as typically Hellenic. It is useless to go back too far in looking for the origin of either type of thought, for neither is possible until some sort of distinction between observing subject and observed object has been made. And there is no trace of such a distinction in the Ionian physicists. They belong to a stage of thought at which these problems had not arisen. Perhaps the first appearance of the objective, rationalist type of thought in philosophy¹ is to be found in Pythagoras' doctrine of *θεωρία*, contemplation as distinct from union. And the first appearance of the other, irrationalist way is certainly to be found in Heracleitus. His attack on *πολυμαθίη* (frs. 16, 17, Bywater), and his repeated allusions to the *λόγος* common to all men and his phrase *ἔδικησάμην ἐμεωντόν* (80) all imply a rejection of the atomistic, objective contemplation of externals (of which he takes Pythagoras as the type in the fragments quoted above) and a turning to the internal knowledge of the self which is the same as the principle of the universe, in which alone, he maintains, is truth and wisdom to be found. And there is one fragment the resemblance of which to Plotinus is most striking. This is 71, *ψυχῆς τείρατα οὐκ ἀν ἔξεύρου πᾶσαν ἐπιπορεύμενος ὁδὸν οὐτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει*. Here we have something remarkably like the infinite self of Plotinus. In fact the whole thought of Heracleitus, as far as can be judged from the fragments, is dominated by the denial of the limits of individuality and of reality as something external, and consequently of discursive reason. And nobody, as far as I know, has yet suggested that Heracleitus was influenced from India.

After Heracleitus the next noteworthy point in the conflict of the two types of Greek thought is the triumph of objectivism and discursive reason in Plato and Aristotle. The objectivist character of Platonism is not affected by its preoccupation with the individual soul, which only served in practice to intensify the distinction between subject and object. The same is true of the denial of the reality of the sensible world and the exaltation of the Ideas as transcendent objects of contemplation, which again served to make the gulf between subject and object more profound.² Another result, significant in view of later developments, was that true knowledge, which for the Platonist was in some sense a unification, tended to be regarded as only attainable by the few. Aristotle accepted objectivism and discursive reason as a matter of course; though his doctrine of the mind which becomes what it thinks was one of Plotinus's most powerful weapons in breaking down the rigid subject-object distinction in the spiritual world.

But although the triumph of objectivist rationalism in philosophy was complete,

¹ On the religious origins of both types of thought see Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy*.

² This does not mean that I think that there was no mystical, religious element in Plato's

thought, which would be absurd; but only that he stressed the subject-object distinction, not the belief that all is One Life. Both world-views are compatible with intense religious feeling.

irrationally
estingly
(C.R., J
is not the
despair
personal
lytus or
might e

The
until the
perhaps
Stoic sys
telian sys
system,
the indi
civilizati
with a v
isolation
panthei
use of
traditio
Stoics
is there
monisti
Frag. I
of the
κόσμος
tinued
viduals
is incor
at leas
inhabit
212-13
as cap
between
δῆμος,
of indi
but sti
true pa

In
‘Positi
‘infini
Chrys
that fo
und Sy

¹ It is
Citium
failure
panthe
sun w
ilarily
of God

² P.
Seneca

the mysteries
last may be
interesting
They seem
ornaments
an to study
t he never
he had, he
ns.

men to deal
above, that
ive idealism
y no means
good deal
(le) regards
n of either
en observ-
of such a
at which
ve, ration-
of *θεωρία*,
ther, irra-
πολυμαθή
l men and
objective
n the frag-
which is the
truth and
which to
ορενόμενος
infinite self
e judged
ity and of
nobody,
dia.

types of
Plato and
eoccupation
stinction
ity of the
ntempla-
profound.²
owledge,
arded as
e reason
what it
he rigid

complete,
only that
n, not the
rld-views
eling.

irrationalism did not altogether vanish from Greek thought. This has been very interestingly demonstrated by Professor Dodds in his paper 'Euripides the Irrationalist' (C.R., July 1929, p. 9). The 'irrationalism' of Euripides here illustrated, however, is not the philosophical doctrine of self and infinite reality as one. It is a mixture of despair of the powers of reason and an uprush of primitive beliefs in the vague, impersonal, irrational forces that govern the world, forces like Kypris in the *Hippolytus* or Dionysus in the *Bacchae*. But the temper which it reveals is one which might easily lead a metaphysician to the theory of the 'infinite self'.

This element, however, in Greek thought remained well in the background until the great religious revival or transformation under the Empire. Nothing, perhaps, illustrates the triumph of discursive reason so well as the character of the Stoic system. The Stoics had several inducements to abandon the Platonic-Aristotelian standpoint in favour of a thorough-going monism. The main object of their system, though not consciously envisaged, was to provide security, a sure footing for the individual in a world where the old safeguards and landmarks of the city-state civilization had vanished. They tried to bring man into some friendly connection with a vast and not very obviously friendly universe. And this sense of individual isolation which the Stoics tried to break down might easily have led them to complete pantheism. And in fact they did go some way towards it. Their respect for and use of Heracleitus might have led them further. But the power of the rationalist tradition was too great for them to break with it.¹ And consequently, with the earlier Stoics at all events, the similarity to Heracleitus does not go very deep. Not only is there a real dualism between *ποιῶν* and *πάσχον*, *θεός* or *λόγος* and *ὑλη*, veiled by monistic language (cp. Bréhier, *Chrysippe* 148-9 and von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Frag.* II. 301-3, 527, etc.) which would not in itself be incompatible with the theory of the 'infinite self', but also, in spite of their assertion of the organic unity of the *κόσμος* (ζῶον . . . λογικὸν καὶ ἐμψυχὸν καὶ νοερόν von Arnim II. 633), they always continued to regard it less as a single being than as an organization of separate individuals. The doctrine of the *ἰδίω ποιῶν* (von Arnim II. 395, cp. Bréhier, *Chrysippe* 154) is incompatible with any true pantheism. And the relation of God and men is often, at least, thought of as purely external. God is the universal Law; and men, as inhabitants of the Universal City, are bound together by this law (Bréhier, *Chrysippe* 212-13). This individualism dominates Stoic epistemology. Truths are thought of as capable of existing in isolation, e.g., in von Arnim II. 132 where the relation between *ἡ ἀλήθεια* and *τὸ ἀληθές* is compared to that between the citizen and the *δῆμος*, and the *δῆμος* is described as *τὸ ἐκ πολλῶν πολιτῶν ἀθροισμα*, that is, a collection of individuals, possibly held together in a more or less organic unity by a single law, but still remaining separate individuals. And as long as this conception lasted any true pantheism was impossible.

In the later, half-Platonized Stoicism, generally, and quite conveniently, labelled 'Posidonius', I can find almost as little trace of the anti-rationalist theory of the 'infinite self'. There is perhaps a movement towards pantheism, as Bréhier's *Chrysippe* suggests.² But I do not find much real evidence for Reinhardt's statement that for Posidonius 'Subjekt und Objekt . . . sich einen und durchdringen' (*Kosmos und Sympathie* 120).³ The supremacy of discursive reason seems to have remained

¹ It is possible that a Semitic strain in Zeno of Citium may have had something to do with the failure of the early Stoics to adopt a complete pantheism. The Semitic religions—star and sun worship, Judaism, Islam—all insist peculiarly uncompromisingly on the transcendence of God and the gulf between him and the world.

² P. 149. But in the passage he quotes from Seneca (*Ep.* 92, 30) 'Totum hoc quo continetur,

et unum est et deus; et socii sumus ejus et membra,' the use of 'socii' suggests that the old idea of the world as an *ἀθροισμα* of individuals still persisted.

³ On the question of Posidonius' 'mysticism', see J. F. Dobson, *The Posidonius Myth*, C.Q. 1918, p. 179. Theiler's examination of the 'Posidonian' element in Plotinus in *Vorbereitung des Neu-Platonismus*, pp. 61-end seems to me to

unchallenged (Witt, *Plotinus and Posidonius*, C.Q. 1930, p. 199 and the references there given). And Posidonius' return to the tripartite Platonic division of the soul and his insistence on individual immortality would probably increase the tendency to objectivism. Plotinus neither desires nor believes in *individual* survival, the survival of the limited ego after death. And the tripartite division of the soul, with its implied dualism, causes him much embarrassment.

It appears then, that in the history of Greek philosophy up to the Platonic-Pythagorean revival in which Neo-Platonism originated, we find a general domination of objective rationalism. But we also find a defiantly anti-rationalist system, that of Heracleitus, and evidence in Euripides of an under-current of non-philosophical irrationalism, present even in the minds of cultured people with some acquaintance with philosophy. It remains to be seen what caused the partial defeat of this rationalism by the sort of pantheistic idealism which we find in some writings of Plotinus (who, however, often writes as an objective rationalist in the best Platonic-Aristotelian tradition), and in the philosophical *Hermetica*. If the doctrine only occurred in Plotinus one might attribute it to his individual genius; for even the most impassioned 'Quellenforscher' must leave a little room for individual thinking in his subject, especially when that subject is a philosopher of the quality of Plotinus. And of course, in view of the extreme difficulty in dating any treatise of the *Corpus Hermeticum* and the character of the writings as an untidy collection of second-hand philosophical ideas with a powerful religious emotion as their only common factor, an influence of Plotinus on the relevant passages cannot by any means be regarded as impossible. But in the opinion of their latest editor, Scott,¹ most of the treatises (with the exception of Asclepius III, which does not effect the question at issue) were written either immediately before or during the lifetime of Plotinus, and even the latest not long after. And this being so their remarkable similarity in temper and sometimes in definite doctrine to some parts of the *Enneads*² is perhaps better accounted for by their both belonging to the same 'climate of opinion'. And if this is so the bold acceptance of the infinity of the intelligible world in I. (Poimandres) 7, and phrases like that in XIII. 2 'Αλλος ὁ γεννόμενος, θεοῦ θεὸς παῖς, τὸ πῦν ἐν πατρὶ (of the man who has undergone the spiritual rebirth or conversion), suggest a common, pre-Neo-Platonic, origin.

It is not, however, necessary, I think, to demand too much of this origin. We have seen that there was a strain of thought of this type in Greek philosophy, exemplified in Heracleitus. And if it is possible also to show that there were elements in

confirm this conclusion. He shows that the doctrine of the universe as an organism goes back to Posidonius, and that Plotinus transferred this doctrine from the visible to the intelligible world; he also shows that the Neo-Platonic stress on unity as the essential principle of being and exposition of the stages of unification also goes back to Posidonius. But he does not show that this conception of organic unity was accompanied by that application of Aristotelian psychology which resulted in the characteristic Plotinian doctrine of 'spiritual interpenetration', which is the necessary foundation of the conception of the 'infinite self'. The later Stoics, under Posidonian influence, might think of the self as an organic part of the All. But they did not identify the two. They did not say 'The part is the whole'. Their theory did not lead them to that paradox of pantheist mysticism expressed by Plotinus in *Enn.* VI. 5. 12

... κατοι καὶ πρότερον θεθα πᾶς· ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ ἄλλο τι προσῆν σοι μετὰ τὸ πῦν, ἐλάττων ἔγινον τῷ προσθήκη. The nearest the 'Posidonian' Stoics came to Plotinus's doctrine is in passages like Seneca *Epf.* 92. 30, Marcus Aurelius 11. 1 (the soul *εἰς τὴν ἀτεπλαν τοῦ ἀλών ἐκτελεῖται*), but even here the full Plotinian development of the thought has not been reached; all that is said is that the human mind has the power of containing, by comprehending, the All. The final step of identifying whole and part has not been taken.

¹ *Hermetica*, Vols. I and II, Introduction and (for probable date of each separate treatise of the *Corpus*) Commentary.

² Especially in the rejection of all external means, sacraments or revelations, of union with God (cp. Bréhier, *Plotin*, p. 114 note; Scott, *Hermetica*, Introduction, p. 8).

the ration easy, and would have from the ... It is per important world, as ideal of the the indiv Pythag to permit Heracleit goreanism horror of indefinite character earliest and occurs in This assoc doctrine ... would na classified on the un

With subject a cations th The sens able befor mind and the world knowledge unlike' v the know in the re nature be Platonist Aristotle of the kn 'knowle the same of 'spirit world wi tition mus the wide tition of k and obj between knowled soul from But still

¹ Which in the co

the rationalist tradition which would help to make the transition to the new doctrine easy, and that there were circumstances in the life and thought of the time that would have an indirect influence in the same direction, I think that we are absolved from the necessity of seeking an Indian origin for Plotinus's 'pantheistic idealism'. It is perhaps worth while to restate what exactly we are looking for. The two important elements in the doctrine are (1) the acceptance of infinity in the intelligible world, as opposed to the closed, well-defined and articulated structure which is the ideal of the rationalist tradition; and (2) the denial of any sharp distinction between the individual ego and the universal principle of reality. As regards the first, the Pythagorean hatred of infinity had too great an effect on all subsequent speculation to permit of any appearance of the opposed doctrine except in a philosopher like Heraclitus, who was in violent reaction against the letter and spirit of Pythagoreanism. But it is worth noticing that the Ionian hylozoists did not share this horror of infinity. Anaximander's *āreipov*, if it was not strictly infinite, was at least indefinite. Therefore it is impossible to say that hatred of infinity was an essential characteristic of the Greek mind. And it is also worth noticing that one of the earliest and most vigorous assertions of the infinity of the intelligible world in Plotinus occurs in V. 7. 3 as a corollary to the statement that there are Ideas of individuals. This assertion of the uniqueness of individuals seems to derive from the Stoic doctrine of the *īdōs ποιόν*; and this individualism of the Stoics, commented on above, would naturally make it less easy to maintain the conception of a finite, neatly classified universe than it was for the Platonists or Aristotelians with their emphasis on the universal or the species-form.

With regard to the other point, the denial of any sharp distinction between subject and object, between ego and principle of the universe, there are certain indications that the breaking down of this distinction did not require any very great effort. The sense of the separate personality of the individual is not very clearly distinguishable before Socrates. And there is most certainly no trace of a Cartesian dualism of mind and matter in Pre-Socratic philosophy. Man is of the same stuff as the rest of the world for the Pre-Socratics, and it is because of this sameness of composition that knowledge is possible. Even in the case of the doctrine of 'knowledge of unlike by unlike' which strove for the mastery with the doctrine of 'knowledge of like by like' the knowledge depended on the presence of the same 'pairs of opposites' in man as in the rest of the world. And this belief that knowledge is due to a community of nature between subject and object persisted in later Greek thought. It is, for the Platonist, because man has something divine in him that he is able to know God. And Aristotle's psychological theory of assimilation, of the actualization of the potentiality of the knowing subject by the object known (with its combination of the theories of 'knowledge of like by like' and of 'unlike by unlike'), is a more refined example of the same idea. And by its means Plotinus was enabled to arrive at his doctrine of 'spiritual interpenetration' by which he preserved multiplicity in his spiritual world without lapsing into atomic individualism. But this doctrine of interpenetration must be clearly distinguished from that of the 'infinite self'. Still more so must the wider theory of community of nature of subject and object¹ as a necessary condition of knowledge. For this is quite compatible with the distinction between subject and object as two entities, not one. And in the Platonic tradition the distinction between subject and object is still further stressed by the removal of the objects of knowledge to a transcendent spiritual world and the consequent detachment of the soul from its environment as a being differing from it in kind rather than in degree. But still this point of view does make the distinction between subject and object less

¹ Which often takes the form of the belief in the universe and human being in the correlative Macrocosm and Microcosm,

sharp and easier to break down than it would be for some more modern thought; and it is therefore well to bear it in mind.

But there is another idea, originating apparently with Aristotle, which shows even more clearly how little regard Greek philosophy had for the integrity of the separate individual. This is the theory of the *Noûs πονητικός* or *χωριστός* of *De Anima* III. 5, which appears to involve the conception of the highest and most important part of the soul as a separable, impersonal entity, the same for all men, persisting unchanged above the flux of individual existence. The conception recurs in Plutarch *De Genio Socratis* 591 E, though there the *νοῦς χωριστός*, according to the temper of the time, is translated into a *δαίμων ἐκτὸς ὄν* and, as there appears to be one of these *δαίμονες* attached to every man, the impersonality of the concept is somewhat reduced. But the essential feature remains, the detaching of the highest part of the soul from the limited individual personality and the making it into something independent and external. It is clear that a pantheism of exactly the Plotinian type could very easily develop from this conception, for in Plotinus it is pre-eminently the highest part of man, the *νοῦς* in him, that is one with the supreme reality; and the descent towards body is marked by an ever greater separateness, a greater degree of atomic individuality. In fact the conception of *νοῦς χωριστός* suits Plotinus' system very much better than it does that of the emphatically non-pantheist and individualist Aristotle.

It seems, then, that there were elements even within the rationalist tradition of something that could easily develop into the Plotinian pantheism. And the spiritual circumstances of the times were peculiarly favourable to its development. It was a period in which the sense of individual isolation in a vast and terrifying universe was perhaps more intensely felt than even immediately after the breakdown of the city-state into the Hellenistic world. For in the Roman Empire, under Babylonian influence, the view of the ruling power of this universe as a cruel, inaccessible Fate, embodied in the stars, worship of which was useless, had come to its full development. The individual exposed to the crushing power of this Fate, and the citizen also of an earthly state which seemed almost as vast, cruel and indifferent as the universe, felt to the full the agony of his isolation and limitation. And all the religions and philosophies of the period try to obtain release for man from this isolation and helplessness.¹ This release may take one of two forms. It may either involve the ascent of the soul, through gnosis or the performance of ritual acts, to a world outside and beyond the Fate-ruled universe, or the recognition that the personality was in fact one with the innermost principle of the universe, that the terrifying isolation did not really exist. In some of the *Hermetic* writings, and above all in Plotinus, the two are combined. Plotinus' God with whom he seeks union is both immanent and transcendent. And both these methods of release are deeply rooted in the traditions of Hellenic philosophy.

A. H. ARMSTRONG.

¹ Cp. Nock, *Conversion*, ch. 7, pp. 99 sqq. p. 225.
Halliday, *Pagan Background of Early Christianity*,

Amer
R. S.
B.C., with
Governor
Re-exami
that the
foundatio
number o
G. McCra
in Pindar
Simonide
dating th
The Exp
shorter li

LVI

J. R.
Letters o
divergenc
that 'Ph
Index L
notices o
Keyes:
'Επιστολ
existed a
H. Com
Alexand
μάθητο
ίος is li
from fri
taminatio
ἐδωγαθή
taminatio
of the 'C
south I
between
424/3 a
Notes on
evidenc
conjectu

LV

A.
regarde
Letter.
Michigan
word λ
show t

SUMMARIES OF PERIODICALS.

LITERATURE AND GENERAL.

American Journal of Philology. LV. 4. October-December, 1934.

R. Syme: *The Spanish Wars of Augustus*. Discusses the campaigns of 26-25 B.C., with special attention to the episode of Causius, and adds a revised list of Governors for the period 27-17 B.C. W. S. Ferguson: *Polyeuktos and the Soteira*. Re-examines the appropriate portions of the Inventory of Asklepios, and suggests that the differences in the 'captions' have important bearing on the date of this foundation. R. M. Geer: *Suetonius*, Augustus, II, 2. Arguing from the normal number of years in a generation, suggests that the information here given is wrong. G. McCracken: *Pindar's Figurative Use of Plants*. Classifies the 'floral' metaphors in Pindar, and compares his usage with that in the fragments of Bacchylides and Simonides. J. N. Hough: *The Use of Greek Words in Plautus*. Seeks a criterion for dating the plays in the 'spasmodic' or 'artistic' use of such words. B. D. Meritt: *The Expense Account of the Samian War*. Offers a revised reconstruction based on a shorter line of 64 letters in place of the 93 originally suggested.

LVI. 1. January-March, 1935.

J. R. Oliver: Charles William Emil Miller *In Piam Memoriam*. R. Carpenter: *Letters of Cadmus*. While defending the Cadmus tradition seeks to explain the divergence between archaeological evidence and the literary sources by suggesting that 'Phoenician' meant originally 'Carian' or 'islander.' A. Diller: *Scipio Tettius' Index Librorum Nondum Editorum*. Finds the only real value of this work in the notices of the libraries and collections actually existing in Rome c. 1555. C. W. Keyes: *The Greek Letter of Introduction*. Concludes that while the extant Τίτοι 'Ἐπιστολικοί' had little influence in Egypt, a number of other more popular manuals existed and supplied various conventional formulae which were freely employed. H. Comfort: *Parody in Catullus LVIIa*. Holds that this poem is a parody of Alexandrianism in general. S. E. Bassett: *On Plato Resp. 618c*. τὸς must refer to μάθηται implied in μάθημα. L. A. Post: *Note on Sophocles O.T. 676-7*. Assumes that τὸς is literally 'equal,' and that the reference is to Creon's loss of status as he falls from friendship with the king. W. Petersen: *Some Greek Examples of Word Contamination*. Examines a number of doubtful or disputed words, e.g. νίξ, βαύος, ἐδωγαθή, ἐλλαμπτάματα, on the assumption that they are actually instances of contamination. T. Frank: *On the Migration of Romans to Sicily*. Suggests that many of the 'citizens' mentioned in the Verrines were actually natives of the island or south Italians enfranchised in 89. B. D. Meritt and G. R. Davidson: *The Treaty between Athens and Haliae*. Seeks to establish the date of this treaty (I.G. I². 25) as 424/3 and offers a new reconstruction of the text. A. B. West: *Prosopographical Notes on the Treaty between Athens and Haliae*. Supports the previous article by the evidence of two other treaties (I.G. I². 145 and I.G. II². 8), both of which are conjecturally referred to 423 B.C.

LVI. 2. April-June, 1935.

A. Diller: *Codex B of Strabo*. Suggests that this MS. should no longer be regarded as the most important of its class. W. H. Worrall: *An Early Bohairic Letter*. Gives a complete text and translation of this letter (Inv. 1526, University of Michigan) with some discussion of the handwriting and vocabulary, especially the word λεβίτων. C. W. Mendell: *Discovery of the Minor Works of Tacitus*. Seeks to show that there were two MSS. containing the minor works in Rome by c. 1455.

H. C. Youre: *Note on ΑΡΧΙΑΑΑΝ*. Suggests an alternative explanation for this Cretan word to that given by Prof. Petersen in A.J.P. LVI. 1, p. 56. A. M. Sturtevant: *Old Saxon Notes*. Ten detailed notes on various points of philological interest. J. E. Harry: *Sophocles*, Electra 363-4. Defends the author's view that the reference is to actual food and material surroundings. B. L. Ullman: *Two Latin Abecedarium from Egypt*. Referring to the two examples given in the *Greek Shorthand Manuals* of H. J. M. Milne, adds notes and suggests that the added line in the second is a transliteration of Greek double letters and diphthongs. D. M. Robinson: *A New Fragment of the Athenian Decree on Coinage*. Gives, with plate from the author's own photograph, a full text and description of the fragment of this recently discovered decree. T. Frank: *A Stray Passage in Strabo V. 1. 12*. Transposes καὶ τὸ στρατιωτικὸν . . . τὴν συντάξιν to V. 1. 12

Athenaeum. XIII. Vol. 1-2.

A. Momigliano attacks the theory of Hampl (in *Der König der Makedonen*), viz. that the King of the Macedonians was the head of the army—'der oberste Kriegs-herr'—elected by the assembly of the people in arms and under oath of allegiance to them as they to him, and not therefore the head of the State, but only one of its functionaries. The people had, Hampl maintains, no share in framing the foreign policy, though he admits there was none till the second half of the third century. M. however analyses several cases in which the king appears to figure as the representative of the State, as e.g. in several pacts of mutual assistance and regulations regarding exports and imports. In Philipp's time he shows that the king was indeed regarded as impersonating the whole State. A. Passerini reproduces the text found on the site of the ancient Callatis and containing the *foedus* between Rome and Callatis. He suggests completions for some of the lacunae, with an attempt at its interpretation based on analogies with the formulae of similar treaties. H. Drexler points out some difficulties caused by Mewaldt's well-known rearrangements in poem IV of Lucretius. To IV 26-44 he would add l. 54 as a necessary sequence, ll. 45-53 being a sketchy and incomplete interpolation. Other sections that raise questions may yet, he thinks, be solved by Mewaldt's method, but D. doubts Mewaldt's explanation of the poet's additions and alteration. He takes his stand on what he conceives to be the strict logical sequence of the ideas.

Vol. 3.

De Robertis discusses the *cura regionum urbis* under the Empire, holding that the functions of the 14 magistrates appointed by Augustus were not—as Mommsen, relying solely on a very fragmentary inscription (*C.I.L.* VI), maintained—of a purely religious or cultural nature such as the care of small shrines to the lares in each of the 14 regions. Augustus found four such offices, and perhaps increased the number to fourteen in pursuance of his policy of weakening the power of other senatorial offices while appearing to pursue a conservative policy. The fact that stone inscriptions mention only religious functions is natural. There is little mention of the relation of these *curatores* to others. Under Hadrian we find one or two *curatores urbis* assigned to each region, but in an inscription of 136 A.D. there are *curatores*, *denuntiatores*, and *magistri vicorum*. This has led to the belief that by this time the institution made by Augustus was either suppressed or largely changed in scope. Marcus Aurelius seems to have widened their administrative powers. Other changes occurred under Alexander Severus. Later the office dwindled and is not enumerated in the list *Notitia Dignitatum*, showing that they had lost senatorial rank. A passage in Pausanias has been interpreted variously by some who think the origin of the Spartan *patronomia* to be earlier than Cleomenes III, and by others who place it later. R. Andreotta holds it likely that the reform dates from Cleomenes himself, showing how the institution fits

tion for this
56. A. M.
philological
's view that
Ullman: *Two*
in the Greek
added line in
gs. D. M.
with plate
ment of this
II. Trans-

edenon), viz.
erste Kriegs-
f allegiance
y one of its
the foreign
century. M.
representa-
s regarding
ed regarded
ound on the
and Callatis.
interpreta-
points out
poem IV of
5-53 being
s may yet,
xplanation
neives to

holding
were not—
I.L. VI),
of small
four such
his policy
pursue a
religious
ratores to
ch region,
ri vicorum.
ustus was
s to have
Alexander
a Dignita-
has been
nia to be
it holds it
ution fits

with his general aims in Spartan reforms. He points out the emphasis laid on its incorporation of the legislature of Lycurgus. In a note on Aristophanes' *Birds*, 690 ff. A. Catandella finds an allusion to ancient Orphic theogony. In *Acharn.* 407 ff. the idea of the transfusion of personalities seems suggested; other passages, perhaps less certainly, seemed to be coloured by these ideas. In a passage from the *Pluto*, a dialogue between the Just Man and the Sycophant, C. traces in detail a personification of some of the tenets of the Sophists. In an interesting attempt to picture the typography of Vesuvius at the time of the Spartacist revolt, M. Baratta gives a conjectural reconstruction of the siege of a small Spartacist band on the vine-clad mountain, and shows how they were able to avoid being seen, and finally make good their counter-attack. Attached is a sketch of the probable formation of the cone at that period. Dealing with Hor. *Carm.* I. 32, P. Ferrarius cites and classifies textual and other critical support for both of the variant readings in l. 1 *poscimur* and *poscimus*. He sums up in favour of the active form in l. 1 and supports the MS. reading of *mihicumque* in l. 15, urging in defence the aesthetic probability and its harmony with the general significance of the Ode with its quasi-ritual appeal.

Classical Philology. XXX. 2. April, 1935.

E. S. McCartney, *Wayfaring Signs*: collects and classifies omens drawn from chance meeting with animals or persons. M. Hadas, *Utopian Sources in Herodotus*: in his account of Scythia, and perhaps elsewhere, H. may have used an 'ethnographic Utopia' such as Aristeas' *Arimaspia*: comparison with Hdt. 4. 104 suggests that the connexion between *Republic* V and the 'parody' in *Ecclesiazusae* may be explained by common use of such a source. Lily R. Taylor, *The Sellisternum and the Theatrical Pompa*: discusses meaning of the *sellae* shown on coins of Titus and Domitian of 80/81 A.D.: distinguishes two types of *sellisternum*—(1) expiatory ceremonies representing banquets of goddesses, (2) ceremonies connected with the theatrical *pompa*, in which *sellae* were provided for deities and for certain members of the imperial house: the coins represent (2). Aline L. Abaecherli, *Imperial Symbols on Certain Flavian Coins*: discusses the triangular and semicircular symbols carried on the imperial *sellae* on the same coins: they symbolize Divus Vespasianus and Diva Domitilla, the triangle representing the *fastigium imperatoris*, the semicircle the canopy of the carriages of imperial ladies: both symbols were *struppi* (the meaning and usage of which is discussed) and made of foliage. C. W. Keyes, *Four Private Letters from the Columbia Papyri*: text of four letters of the Roman period, with short commentary. R. A. Pack, *The Plot of Menander's 'Dyscolus'*: seeks to establish details of characterization and treatment from meagre evidence. B. L. Ullman, *The Codex Maffeanus of Cicero's Philippics*: a reasoned identification with Cod. Ottob. 1992. L. E. Law, *The πόλεμος ἀκήρυκτος*: criticizes E. M. Walker's arguments (*C.A.H.* iv) against Hdt's. account and holds that, if Hdt. is wrong, it is in misplacing the oracle. S. L. Moehler, *The Bithynian Christians Again*: in Pliny, *Ep.* 10. 96. 7 the antiphonal *carmen* is the Jewish shema and benedictions, and the common meal refers not to the distinctive formal eucharist but the simple traditional ceremony of 'blessings.' W. Avery, *Julia and L. Vinicius*: Julia's visit to Baiae (Suet. *Aug.* 64) must have been before her marriage to Marcellus in 25.

XXX. 3. July, 1935.

J. A. O. Larsen, *Was Greece Free between 196¹ and 146 B.C.?* Examines evidence for the nature of the Roman protectorate and the actual relations between Greek states and Rome: appendices on (1) the treaties with Sparta, Messene and Elis, (2) that with the Achaean League. G. M. Calhoun, *The Art of Formula in Homer—EIIEA ΠΙΤΕΠΟΕΝΤΑ*: the formula $\ddot{\epsilon}\pi\cdot\pi\tau\epsilon\rho$. is uniformly associated with sudden emotional reactions, animation, tension, while $\ddot{\epsilon}\pi\sigma\tau'\ddot{\epsilon}\phi\sigma\tau'\ddot{\epsilon}\kappa\tau'\ddot{\sigma}\nu\ddot{\omega}\mu\ddot{\alpha}\zeta\sigma\tau'$ covers the same range of situation but emphasizes earnestness or affection: both formulae,

whatever their origin, are particularized in usage. G. E. Duckworth, *The Structure of the 'Miles Gloriosus'*: argues for unity against Jachmann's theory of combination of two originals and criticizes J.'s conception of the relation between Plautus and New Comedy. W. H. P. Hatch, *The Origin and Meaning of the Word 'Uncial'*: notes exx. of *litterae unciales* from 4th to 13th cent. and suggests meaning 'letters occupying $\frac{1}{2}$ of a line each': cites six 4th and 5th cent. short-line MSS. which show an average of 12 letters per line. Gladys Martin, *Transposition of Verses in the 'Pervigilium Veneris'*: transposes 58-62 to follow 7, in 58 reading *ducit* and taking *umbras* to have special ref. to ritual *casae* (cf. Fest. 519L): finds no other transposition necessary. J. T. Allen, *Notes on Aristophanes*: Ach. 24, for *εἴτη δ'* reads *εἴτοι* (parenthetical): Thesm. 1181, for *ἀνώθεν* reads *ἀνώμεθ*: Eq. hypoth. i (ii), *δημοσίᾳ* has supplanted the date *'Ολυμπιάδι τέτει δ'*. F. P. Johnson discusses compounds of preposition + noun with reference to *ἐπεισόδιον*, *μετόπη* and *τρίγλυφος*.

Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendlbildung. XI. 4. 1935.

T. Hetzer, *Die schöpferische Vereinigung von Antike und Norden in der Hochrenaissance* (with 17 illustrations in 4 plates). Emphasizes the living Gothic elements in the Baroque in contrast to the formality of later classical revivalism. W. Vetter, *Die Musik im platonischen Staate*. A sympathetic attempt to appreciate the ethical side of Plato's approach to music. W. Stach, *Deutsche Dichtung im lateinischen Gewande*. Argues that national elements can be distinguished in the medieval Latin poetry of Germany.

XI. 5. 1935.

E. Kalinka, *Die Sage von der Gründung Roms*. A critical analysis of all phases of the development of the orthodox story.

Philologus. XC. (N.F. XLIV.) 1. 1935.

H. Diller, *In Sachen Tertullian-Minucius Felix*. In considering whether Minucius' *Octavia* preceded Tertullian's *Apologeticum* or not he combats J. Martin's theory that M. used Cyprian's *Quod idola*. Believes the latter to be a contamination (? of the *Octavia* and Cyprian's *ad Donatum*) and not a true work of Cyprian's (*to be continued*). F. Dirlmeier, ΘΕΟΦΙΔΙΑ ΦΙΛΟΘΕΙΑ. Examines meaning of *θεοφιλία* (=favour of the gods) and traces the conception back through Greek epic via Ionia to the East (*to be continued*). A. Gudeman, *Die Textüberlieferung der aristotelischen Poetik*. The archetype of all our MSS. dates from some point in the first few centuries of our era. It split into three main streams (*to be continued*). F. Th. Kakridis, ΜΕΛΕΑΓΡΕΙΑ. Examines the story of Meleager as found in Homer and, deriving it from a pre-Homeric form, traces it down to modern Aetolian versions. A. Passerini, *Il concetto antico di Fortuna*. The Roman conception of Fortune was not that of divine favour, but of an immanent power, capable, indeed, of generating *invidia* in the gods. F. Stroux, *Aus einem neuen KOMENTAPION griechischer Kurzschrift*. Notes on the papyrus remains of a Greek school dictionary, containing, *inter alia*, a list of Menander's plays and giving us two new titles: *Χρηστή* and *Νέπερις*.

MISZELLEN: F. Gottsack, *Zum Monumentum Ancyranum und Monumentum Antiochenum*. Additional notes to his article in *Bayer. Blätter für das Gymnasial-Schulwesen* 66 (1930) written in the light of fresh material supplied by Markowski. M. Pohlenz, *Der Römer Gaius bei Kallimachos*. Cites parallels from Greek and Latin literature to one of the new Callimachus *δημητήσεων* (i.e. Col. v. 25: *Φησὶ Πενκετίων, κτλ.*). A. Turyn, *Zur Pindar-Ueberlieferung*. Combats Maas' theory of relationship of Pindar's MSS. and advances a new one: β (= BE) and γ (= GH) are 'cousins,' and ζ (= Paris group) depends on β . F. Walter, *Zu Ammianus Marcellinus*. Offers emendations on XX. 11. 32; XXII. 15. 9; XXI. 4. 1; XXV. 8. 4; XXIX. 3. 7; XXX. 4. 2; XXX. 5. 10.

the Structure
combination of
s and New
notes exx.
occupying
an average
Pervigilium
was to have
necessary.
(synthetical):
planted the
tion + noun

• 4. 1935
der Hoch-
ic elements
W. Vetter,
the ethical
lateinischen
eval Latin

all phases

g whether
J. Martin's
tamination
rian's (*to be*
meaning of
Greek epic
der aristos
in the first
). F. Th.
in Homer
in Aetolian
ception of
indeed, of
ON *griech-*
inary, con-
s: *Χρηστή*

Antioch-
hulwesen 66
J. Pohlenz,
terature to
(*κτλ.*). A.
of Pindar's
ξ (= Paris
dations on
XX. 4. 2;